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
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
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ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE;

OR

OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

D R. F R A N C I S T H E R E M I N,

BY

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD.


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P R E F A C E ,
BY THE TRANSLATOR.

It is believed that this little treatise upon Rhetoric possesses some characteristics which render it worthy of a place among the current English treatises on this subject. Perhaps no one will be ready to assent to all the positions laid down in it, and many may think that in its method and spirit it is altogether too foreign to our own modes of thought and expression, to be of any worth to the English student. Still, if used in the right way, it is thought that it may be made to contribute to a broad and thorough discipline in this department of culture. For no production, especially of a foreign mind, should be servilely received by the student, or allowed to exert an arbitrary and violent influence upon him. He should retain his own individuality and nationality in their most independent and determined forms, while, at the same time, he opens his mind and heart to all that is true and genial

in a foreign literature. Non-intercourse is as impolitic and injurious in the world of contemplation, as it is in the world of action.

Moreover, the present state of Rhetoric, considered as one of the co-ordinate branches of discipline, to which the mind of the student is subjected in the course of liberal education, seems to call for the infusion of an element which may be found in this treatise of Theremin. Rhetoric, in its best estate, is but the science of Form, or, to use Milton's phrase, an "organic"—*i. e.*, instrumental—Art. It does not propose to furnish the material of knowledge, but only to put the material, when furnished, into as fine and perfect forms as possible. Owing partly to this intrinsic nature of Rhetoric as an Art, and partly perhaps to the excessively popular character which science and scientific statements have assumed in the present age, Rhetoric has become extremely superficial in its character and influence, so that the term "rhetorical" has become the synonyme of shallow and showy. Dissevered from Logic, or the necessary laws of Thought, it has become dissevered from the seat of life, and has degenerated into a mere collection of rules respecting the structure of sentences and the garnish of expression.

Any treatise, therefore, of which the tendency is to restore the connection between Thought and its expression, cannot but be beneficial in its influence upon both the theory and practice of Eloquence. Even if it were constructed upon a false fundamental principle, and, as a systematic whole, were incorrect, still the mere effort to systematize the subject—the striving to ground it in something deeper and more solid than its own hollow forms, would not be without its salutary influence upon the art itself and the student. It would, at least, direct attention to the fact, that an art like Rhetoric should be based upon some science, and that its rules and maxims, in order to be efficient and influential, must be the off-shoots of principles lying deeper than themselves. It would point to the adaptation that really exists in the nature of things, and that ought actually to exist in practice, between an instrument employed by the human mind, and addressing itself to it, and the human mind itself.

The work of Theremin, whether it be true or false in substance, is, what it purports to be, a *systematic* Rhetoric. It does not begin with rules, and it does not, in starting, deal in minute observations upon minutiae; but it begins with the Ideas which are con-

ceived to underlie the whole subject, and to constitute the ground and soil from which the whole after-development and detail will naturally spring. It begins at the beginning, goes through the middle, and so arrives at the end.

Now there is power in such a method, apart from its contents. The course and movement of the system is according to Nature. Commencing with the Matter, it proceeds to the Form, which is to take shape and character, and all its qualities, from that primitive material for whose sake alone it has any existence at all.

“ Wel may men knownen, but it be a fool,
That every part deriveth from his hool.
For Nature hath not taken his beginning
Of no partie ne cantel of a thing,
But of a thing that parfit is and stable
Descending so, til it be corrumpable.”

Chaucer.

The whole tendency of such a theory of Rhetoric is to produce, in practice, masculine and thoughtful discourse. The student, if we may use the term, is headed right, by it, and is taught to apply his best power to the evolution of truth and the production of thought in his own mind, not surely to the neglect of the Form in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the high-

est and most perfect elaboration of the Form. He is taught to be severe with himself, to forget himself in the theme, that he may exhibit it with that boldness and freedom of manner, that daring strength and grandeur of treatment, which is absolutely beyond the reach of him who is anxious respecting the impression he may make—who, in short, is tormented by too much consciousness of self, at a time when he should be absorbingly conscious of the theme.

According to the theory here presented, the oration,—meaning by this, every rounded and complete discourse,—is the evolution of an Idea, which is the germ and principle of the whole composition. Hence it is simple in its structure, and homogeneous in its character—fitted to enlist the whole attention of the hearer, and to produce one distinct total impression.

Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, in the very beginning of his intellectual life, to be habituated to compose in the light, and by the guidance, and under the impulse, of Ideas—than to be enabled to discover those germinal truths which are pregnant with life, and which, when embodied with freedom and power in a discourse, constitute the ground-work of the finest creations of the human mind. And apart from

the benefit which is to be derived from this habit and ability, for the practical purposes of Rhetoric, what a benefit is derived from it in respect to the private contemplations and enjoyment of the scholar ! Supposing he does not need this ability, because he is never called upon to speak or write to his fellow-men, (a supposition that is hardly to the credit of an educated man in this peculiar age,) does he not need it, in order that his own mind may reach essential truth, and may, in its own reflections, follow the method and order of Reason. In what a serene and constant illumination does that mind dwell, which is able in its meditations to find the fonsal truth as it were by instinct, and to unfold it by its own light, and in accordance with its own structure !

By such a theory the student is introduced into the world of Ideas, Laws and Principles, and is taught to begin with these, and from them to work out towards detail, elaboration and ornament. It is a mysterious world, it is true, and it must be, from the very fact that it is the source and origin. But it is the very office-work of thinking, to convert these Ideas into clear conceptions ; to put these vast unlimited truths into defi-

nite and intelligible discourse ; in fine, in the strict meaning of the term, to *develope* truth.

He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves truth as he finds it ; who does not, by the aid of close thinking and a rigorous, remorseless logic, compel the dark truthful Idea to yield up its secret ; who does not force the contents out of the all-comprehending Law or Principle. And he is the clear and intelligible discourser, in the only high sense of the term,—clear while solid, intelligible while weighty,—who, not starting in light to make things light, starts in darkness and works his way out into high noon. In both the Pagan and Christian cosmogonies, Creation emerged from Old Night.

But if we are not mistaken, the theory presented in this work is true in its substance. It teaches that Eloquence is moral in essence ; that it has a moral origin, moral means and movement, and a moral end. It teaches, with what may seem pertinacity to some, that in its substance and its accidents, its primary laws and secondary rules, Eloquence is ethical.

This is not a new theory. As the Author remarks, it was distinctly announced by the elder Cato, and

mentioned with approbation by Quintilian, a critic whose exquisite taste often brought him to an indistinct intimation of truths, which a more profound genius would have brought out into distinct intuition. It has, moreover, been the tacitly-received theory of all the great minds—the really eloquent—of the race. We have it on the authority of Cicero,* that “Socrates dicere solebat, omnes, in eo, quod *scirent*, satis esse eloquentes.” By this he could only mean, that the *moral* feeling and interest generated by clear *knowledge* of truth, is the ground of that methodical, earnest, and animating mental action which we denominate Eloquence—a truth which may be found substantially, if not formally, falling from the lips of Socrates in the *Gorgias*. Add to this the decisive statement of Buffon, “Le style—c'est l'homme,” which meets with an equally decisive response within us, together with the views of Eloquence left us in the remarkable fragments of Pascal, and we find that the theory in question is no newly broached one, but one that is unconsciously formed by the thoughtful and eloquent mind everywhere.

* *De Oratore*. I., 14.

Most certainly the tendency and influence of such a theory of Eloquence must be good and elevating. Setting aside the fact, that if it be the true theory, it is the only one by the aid of which Eloquence can come into existence, it is the only *working* theory—it is most certainly a great point gained, if an Art, so often supposed to be at farthest remove from earnestness and seriousness, which is regarded too commonly as the Art by which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and real work has been done, is shown to have its native seat and source in Ethics. The expression of thought by this theory becomes a sincere process, and the mind, while giving utterance to its reflections, is really contributing to the moral culture and developement of the man. The productions of such a Rhetoric are marked by that grave and conscientious character which is the natural fruit of simplicity and sincerity in the mental processes. The influence of the theory is felt even in the language employed. It is no longer stiff, stilted, and aloof from the thought, but pliant, vital, and con-substantial with it.

Finally, it is believed that the theory of Eloquence here set forth, harmonizes with the true theory of Art. Perhaps the greatest defect in many of the current

treatises upon Rhetoric is the absence of correct views of the principles of Art. Oratory is confessedly one of the Fine Arts ; and how, then, can a clue to its mystery and power be obtained without a philosophic knowledge of those laws and principles by which Embodiment, whether in Nature or Art, is regulated and impelled ?

We say Embodiment whether in Nature or Art, because the method of each is essentially the same. In both, a creative Idea is the starting point and the guiding principle, and the movement in both is free and original. A genuine work of Art is no more a copy or a mechanical production, than a work in Nature is. It is not the product of ingenuity improved by practice and experience, but of impulsive genius, and the same characteristics are found in it, according to the degree of its perfection as a work of Art, that are found in Nature. Indeed, we demand that a work of Art have Nature in it, *i.e.*, be original, fresh, living, glowing, breathing ; a demand that would be unreasonable if there were no likeness at bottom between Art and Nature. As Nature, according to Sir Thomas Brown, is the Art of God, so Art is man's Nature, and sustains the same

relation to the Finite mind that Creation does to the Infinite.

By this is not meant, of course, that it sustains the same relation *materially*, but only *formally*. The work of Art is the creation of the Finite Imagination, in the sense that it is the embodiment and result of an Idea, a productive thought, which sprang from the innermost recesses of this human faculty. As Nature is the result and embodiment of divine Ideas, so Art is the result and embodiment of human Ideas. The two differ from each other as the Infinite differs from the Finite, but they are alike, as reason in man is the same in kind with reason in God. We say, then, that the work of Art is formally—*i. e.*, in respect to its origin from a productive Idea, and in respect to the plastic method of its construction,—like the work of Nature; that man, the Artist, works creatively, not in the absolute and highest sense of creating something out of nothing, in which sense God is the only creator, but in the secondary yet significant sense of embodying Ideas, of producing works to which the terms applied to the works of Nature, find a natural and spontaneous application, the world over.

Now, it is evident that Rhetoric, whose office it is to guide the student into the right method of embodying his thought, and which is the very science of Form, should itself be formative, constructive, plastic. But how is such a Rhetoric possible, if the theory that is formed is not only not conformed to, but positively contradicts, the laws and principles of what, after the remarks above made upon Nature and Art, may be denominated **Universal Art**? Plainly, then, it is only by a deep and true insight into the nature of Art, in its widest sense, that a system of Rhetoric can arise that will lead to the production of works appealing with power to the imagination as well as the intellect.


This treatise of Theremin, while it strictly distinguishes Eloquence by virtue of its moral character and its external aim and end, from a merely artistic process, at the same time sufficiently recognizes the æsthetic element in it, and while, by some, the Author might be thought to have carried out his theory too rigorously, and have shown too much fear lest the high ethical character of Eloquence should be suffered to lose itself in the lower sphere of mere Art, he has by this very thing imparted to Eloquence a still higher character and a still more energetic power. For by thus

insisting that, while the means employed by Eloquence may be æsthetic, and the form in which it appears artistic, the great *end* constantly aimed at must be moral, and only moral, the Author has furnished a Rhetoric that is not only formative and plastic, but *organific*, and has thus superinduced life upon the lifeless. Art in this case passes over into the production of living realities ; the old fable of Pygmalion becomes actuality ; the oration is not only a beautiful and faultless Form, it is also a living Soul.

The work has been translated mainly for the purpose of furnishing a text-book, to be used in a free reproductive manner in giving instruction in the department of Rhetoric. It is believed, however, that any one who shall make use of it, by entering into its spirit and method in a free and independent manner, will find more or less in it promotive of a sound way of thought, and a serious deep-toned Eloquence.

THE TRANSLATOR.

University of Vermont, Nov. 24th, 1849.



ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE;

OR,

OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION.

It has often surprised me, that while in modern times the theory of the Fine Arts, and especially of Poetry, has reached so high a degree of clearness and completeness, Rhetoric still consists of unconnected principles, and is not competent either to guide the practice of Eloquence by sure rules, or to give satisfactory information with respect to the nature and qualities of the subject of which it treats—of Eloquence itself. Hence it has seemed to me not to be superfluous to make the attempt, whether the gift of Eloquence cannot be represented as one of the fundamental powers of man, and whether its laws cannot

be derived from one of the higher philosophical sciences, so that everything uncertain and mutable may disappear from the Theory as well as the Practice of it.

I must, indeed, fear that such an undertaking will appear useless to many, and that I shall be asked “What is gained by Theories generally? Has all the philosophizing upon Art, in modern times, produced a more beautiful bloom of Poetry? Did not Eloquence attain its highest perfection among the ancients, although probably among them, as among us, its highest principle either remained unknown, or at least, never distinctly presented itself to the orator? Only by means of rules which were drawn from experience, and which had respect to individual particulars in the formation of the oration, only by means of a constant practice which began in earliest youth and never ceased, and not by means of general theories, did Demosthenes and Cicero form themselves; only by means of a similar discipline, and not by means of text-books, can Eloquence, which has sunk so very low among us, be raised up, if indeed it is to be raised up at all.”

These objections would be perfectly well grounded, if Eloquence, since the establishment of the Christian Church, had not appeared in a form entirely unknown to the ancients, and one to which we are obliged to have special reference. The political and civil relations amidst which, exclusively and alone, Eloquence appeared among the ancients, were sufficient of themselves to secure it from deviations from the true course, and to render more precise theories unnecessary. For him, who spoke before the court or in the popular assembly upon a matter which would be decided immediately upon the close of his

oration, the effect was the surest proof whether he had spoken well or not ; and when the highest personal interests were at stake, it was very natural that the orator should call forth all his powers in order to succeed, and that he would learn to understand and avoid those faults which might draw after them the loss of wealth, influence, life, and freedom. The sacred orator, on the contrary, stands in a relation to his hearer, and treats of a subject, which do not allow of such decisive proof. Whether he has instructed, edified, improved, or has merely superficially pleased and moved his hearer, the effect of his sermons can very seldom inform him, since this, from its very nature, remains concealed in the mind, and almost never comes into sight. Since therefore he is not, like the orator before the court and in the popular assembly, impelled towards the prescribed end by a pressing danger ; since he is not shut up within such narrow limits, which render deviation to the right or left almost impossible, he runs the greatest risk of error, if without settled theory and principles. He must be able to give the most accurate account, to his own mind, of all that he does ; and that deeper insight into the principles of Eloquence, which the ancient orator did not need, is indispensable to him.

Moreover, many are of opinion that Eloquence, which in Greece and Rome reached so high a degree of perfection, disappeared from the earth with the destruction of ancient freedom, and never again found its home upon it. According to this opinion, Eloquence is therefore less an original impulse in man, than Poetry ; it is a creature of circumstances, by which it is not only more or less favored, but is produced and destroyed ; the republican constitutions of antiquity were necessary to its

developement ; and now, when social life, the spirit of the age, and the form of government, are so entirely different, that which we call Eloquence is either utterly unworthy of this name, or is only the mere shadow of that ancient powerful faculty.* Whether this opinion is well grounded or not, can be known only after such an investigation as we are intending to institute. If we do not succeed in showing that Eloquence is one of the fundamental powers in man, this opinion will stand unassailed, and whoever in modern times thinks himself to be an orator must simply give up his pretensions. But if we do succeed, and do actually point out a particular original power, whose developement in a certain direction necessarily produces Eloquence, then Eloquence is no longer the ephemeral bloom of a particular age ; and although it may conceal itself, and sometimes may appear under another name, it nevertheless lives a life just as real and forceful, in modern, as in ancient times.

Finally, there are men—and men, too, highly distinguished for learning and science,—who set a very low estimate upon Eloquence, and would have nothing to do with it. For, in their opinion, it is perfectly clear that its purpose is to excite the feelings, which is always useless, and sometimes even injurious ; nay, Eloquence commonly carries its pretensions still further, and, in the best orators, it is the design plainly prominent, and even acknowledged by themselves, to master the heart, to rule the will, and turn it whithersoever they

* Magna ista et notabilis eloquentia quæ in bene constitutis civitatibus non oritur.—*De Caus. Corr. Elog.*, c. 40.

wish. But this, from its very nature, whatever be the manner in which it is done, is not at all compatible with the relations in which man stands to his fellow-man, and is therefore, strictly considered, contrary to morality; and the more so, from the fact, that commonly the orator makes use of cunning and deceptive tricks of art, rather than honorable weapons. In their opinion, we should address the understanding alone, and satisfy it by means of stringent arguments; all excitement of the Feelings, and influencing of the Will, were better omitted. This class of opponents, as has been remarked, is a very important one; at its head stand names of distinction—Aristotle* among the ancients, Kant† among the moderns; their objections have the very strongest appearance of truth, and as yet have not been answered in a satisfactory manner by any of the modern advocates of Eloquence, who have made far too little of them. But this question also, whether there

* 'Αλλ' θλης οὖσης τρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥήτορικὴν, οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος, 'αλλ' ὡς διαγκαίον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον.

Rhetor., Lib. III., c. 1.

† I must confess, that while a beautiful poem always gives me pure pleasure, the perusal of the best orations of the popular orators of Rome, or the parliamentary or pulpit orators of the present time, is always accompanied with the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation towards a cunning art which understands how to move men like machines, to a judgment which, upon calm after-thought, must lose all its worth with them. Oratory, considered as the art of making use of the weaknesses of men, for its own purposes, (be these never so well meant, or be they actually good, as they are always intended to be,) is worthy of no esteem at all.—*Critik der Urtheilkraft*, p. 215.

It is also said of Eloquence, in the *Dialogue de Caus. Corr. Elog.*, c. 40, that it is “alumna licentiae, quam stulti libertatem vocabant, comes seditionum, effrenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine servitute, contumax, temeraria, adrogans.”

is anything contrary to morality in the attempt to acquire mastery over the minds of others, can be decided only by means of such an investigation as we contemplate. For, if it should actually turn out to be impossible to derive each and all of the rules of Eloquence from one and the same fundamental principle ; if the theory of Eloquence should be found to consist only of some maxims derived from experience and observation, which can be brought together under no unity, this would certainly be a very strong presumption against it. The impossibility of constructing its fundamental principles philosophically, would greatly lower it, and would throw it into the same class with other abilities of an ambiguous nature, in relation to which this same thing occurs—with Prudence, Worldly Wisdom, Hypocrisy, or, in the phrase of Plato,* with the art of Cookery. If, however, we succeed in laying down an all-comprehending principle as the ground of Eloquence, it will then appear of itself, whether this is good or bad ; although Eloquence would be acquitted of all charges on the score of being contrary to morality, from the mere philosophical form of its theory, since that which depends upon a fundamental power of man, cannot possibly contradict his moral sense.

* Platonis Georgias ed. Heindorf, p. 53.

CHAPTER II.

ELOQUENCE IS NOT SOMETHING BETWEEN POETRY AND
PHILOSOPHY.

THREE different characteristics of Eloquence attract notice immediately upon the first examination. First, it is evident that Eloquence seeks to separate the true from the false, and to satisfy the understanding by argument. The powerful enthymemes of Demosthenes, the assertion of Aristotle that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and Cicero's affirmation that he had made himself an orator, not in the schools of the Rhetoricians, but in the walks of the Academy,* testify plainly enough to the affinity of Eloquence with Philosophy. Secondly, Eloquence approximates to Poetry also, through the liveliness of its representations, and the use of turns and figures which are similar to those of Poetry. But, thirdly, Eloquence is distinguished from Philosophy as well as Poetry by the outward end after which it strives, by that mastery over minds, which it does not quietly wait for, but obtains by a struggle, and by the innumerable references which must be regarded in such a striving, and which are entirely foreign to Philosophy as well as to Poetry.

Characteristic marks of three kinds, therefore, are to be

* Fateor me oratorem, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex academis spatis exituisse.—*Orator. c. 3.*

found in Eloquence: 1. An affinity with philosophy; 2. An affinity with Poetry; 3. A striving after an outward end. In order to find a fundamental principle of Eloquence, one of these three characteristics must be made predominant; for they cannot exist beside each other in equal dignity. Should it be affirmed that the Beautiful and the True, which in Poetry and Philosophy are principal, in Eloquence appear as adjuncts and subservient to outward ends, the difficulty is not yet removed; for the question ever returns—What is the law according to which the True and the Beautiful may be used for the attainment of outward ends? So long as this is not given, Eloquence has not found its highest fundamental principle.

If we take our stand upon this point of view, where Eloquence appears as something fluctuating between Philosophy, Poetry, and mere Worldly Wisdom, the theory projected in accordance with this view, cannot satisfy the philosopher; and just as little will it be a sure guide for the pupil in oratory.

First, the teacher says to him, "You must select a subject, and must endeavor to treat it fundamentally." This he does in all faithfulness, and thus, imperceptibly, there arises under his hands a philosophic essay. "This is good for nothing," says the teacher, "where is the rising sweep, the life, the poetic ornament, by which these truths are to make an entrance?" This censure seems just to him, and he now throws himself into the other extreme, and that which he produces is the most disagreeable of all caricatures—poetic prose. Having once more failed, it is now said to him, "You discourse as if you were alone by yourself, with no hearers before you, into whose circumstances, into whose way of thinking, you must enter!"

Who will find fault with the pupil, if at this point he falls into a sort of desperation, and addresses his instructor somewhat after this manner: “ In Heaven’s name ! what is that you require of me ? Am I to unite, in one, three things entirely different from each other : philosophic profundity, poetic ornament, and reference to an outward end ? Tell me first, if this union is possible ; and if it is, then give me the higher principle under which three so different requisitions can be brought into one ; show me the rule which determines how much I may concede to the subject-matter, how much to beauty of form, how much to the hearer, in order that each may co-exist with all, and that an unlucky preponderance may not oscillate from one side to another. For I can now no longer cast my work in an old form, without troubling myself about the wherefore, without asking myself why that which I produce must look precisely thus, and whether it might not look entirely differently ; I wish in my oration, from beginning to end, to see the necessity of every single part. So then show me the principle which groups all others under itself, and from which all rules readily derive themselves.”

CHAPTER III.

ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY.

If, therefore, one of the three characteristic marks of Eloquence is to be made the fundamental one, it might be supposed that its affinity with Poetry is the one, and that the same fundamental principle which reigns in the representations of Poetry must also guide in the practice of Oratory. But this would pre-suppose that Eloquence give up its striving after an outward end, as something incompatible with Poetry, which it cannot do without renouncing its own nature and peculiarity —or else that Poetry adapt itself to this striving, and to all the references connected with it, which is equally impossible.

When Poetry clothes its ideas in forms, it can demand nothing more than the perception and recognition, that the idea is perfectly suited to the form, and the form to the idea ; its design can never be to implant the ideas, which it has wrought out with such pleasure to itself, in another mind ; the one process would injure the other ; in the two-fold effort to exhibit his own mind and to work upon the mind of another, the Poet would succeed in neither. Indeed, nothing is so very much suited to produce the feeling of displeasure and disgust as an oration overloaded with poetical ornament ; we pity the ignorance which selects means so unsuitable for its ends ; we are indignant at the profanation which would force

Poetry to subserve outward ends. Eloquence, therefore, cannot be regarded as a part of Poetry.

But, secondly, is it not possible to make the Philosophic element in it the fundamental principle of Eloquence? Since in Eloquence, as in Philosophy, Ideas are presented in a certain sequence and in a certain connection, its coincidence with the art of Philosophizing might be so great as that it should fall into this and constitute only a part of it. But here the very obstacle which rendered the union of Eloquence with Poetry impossible, shows itself again—that striving, namely, after an outward end, which is just as essential to Eloquence as it is foreign to Philosophy. Philosophy can recognize no other law by which its representations are to be guided, than that which lies in the Ideas themselves; these Ideas themselves are simply to come forth in their greatest possible clearness, and in their greatest possible compass. The problem of Eloquence, on the contrary, is to gain over to its Ideas a mind thus or thus disposed. The laws which Philosophy follows in its representations cannot therefore be the highest and sole rules of Eloquence, since, besides these, it has still others to obey which are imposed upon it by the outward end after which it strives.

• This truth is of the greatest importance for the success of our investigation, and I must call attention to it the more, since from the great tendency of the Germans to Philosophizing, it is certainly to be feared that it will meet with opposition from many of my readers. "Is not," it may be objected, "this profound and powerful developement of Ideas, which is the essential element in the Philosophic representa-

tion, itself also the most infallible means of making an entrance for these Ideas into the minds of others, and thus of fulfilling all the requisitions of Eloquence?" Let one make this attempt, but let him make it with thoroughness, without suffering himself to be diverted by circumstances from the purpose once fixed upon. Let one lose himself entirely in the Idea; let him develope it in its whole compass; let him not omit even the least of all that can serve to exhibit it still more clearly; let him forget, as is fitting, the place where he stands; let him confine himself to no definite time, but speak until his subject is exhausted; let him not trouble himself about his hearers, about the degree of their culture, about their capacities, qualities, prejudices, and inclinations; in a word, let him seek only to express his own mind;—will such a discourse be adapted to gain over an opposing mind and to transfer the sentiments of the orator into his hearers? I think not. Hence no one who refers the Rhetorical manner and method to the Philosophical, is able in his practice to remain true to his theory. Imperceptibly he concedes something to time, to place, to the occasion, to the hearers; and thus there arises a product which is neither Philosophical nor Rhetorical, and which can satisfy no one who is accustomed to judge of things with strictness.

If I understand him rightly, Aristotle makes this attempt, which must ever be a failure, to connect Eloquence with the art of Philosophizing, in order to obtain a simple, firm, constituent principle for it. In the very beginning of his work he lays down the position that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and it seems as if all is to be derived from this, and that Rheto-

ric is in this way to acquire a scientific unity. But this first assertion compels him to a second, by which Eloquence becomes strangely limited in its sphere. "In Eloquence," he says, "which depends upon Dialectics, the arguments are the only thing pertaining to the art, and it should, properly, confine itself simply to showing whether a thing has or has not happened. It is owing to the imperfection of governments alone, that Eloquence has introduced the Ideas of Justice and Injustice into its sphere, and assumes to excite the Feelings." Now, it would be interesting to see what sort of a Rhetoric would have arisen, if Aristotle had strictly maintained and carried out this principle; but whether it was because an Eloquence so narrowly limited did not satisfy him, or because he felt himself obliged to take Eloquence as he found it in actual existence, he lets the principle drop again immediately. Hence we are not a little surprised to see how soon he is no longer content with the purely dialectic arguments, but, besides these, calls in those means of persuasion also which lie in the moral state of the orator and in the inward condition into which the hearer has been put. But, in order to the apprehension of these, Dialectics no longer suffices; the knowledge of the virtues and the affections is requisite for this, and Aristotle finds himself compelled to the acknowledgment that Eloquence is no longer akin to Dialectics alone, but also to the Ethical science called Polities. Thus he gets a fundamental principle having a two-fold nature, and destructive of all scientific unity—a quality, moreover, that is not to be met with again in the whole work.

CHAPTER IV.

ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE.

SINCE, therefore, Rhetoric cannot acquire a scientific form, if Eloquence is to be regarded as something fluctuating between Poetry and Philosophy; since, furthermore, it can be subordinated neither to Poetry nor Philosophy, there is only one way left to find its highest fundamental principle—if it has one,—namely, to examine the third of the characteristic qualities noticed in it, the striving after an outward end, and to see if it will not lead to a firm fundamental principle.

Production in Poetry and Philosophy is a species of activity which may be denominated the isolated, or that which retreats into itself again. For it simply unfolds an Idea, and in the process has no other end but this Idea and its unfolding. That which has been formed in this way can, indeed, like all that exists, exert an outward influence; yet it never owes its origin to the design of exerting such an influence.

There is another species of Activity, which always aims at an outward change, either in the sentiments and conduct of men, or in the social and family relations, or in the civil and ecclesiastical. Now, to this species of Activity—the sum-total of which constitutes Social Life—Eloquence also belongs, and it is so entirely implicated in the circumstances existing at the particular time, that even in thought it cannot be separated

from them. For although it is easy enough in the case of a tragedy of Sophocles, to contemplate it as something existing for itself, and to think of it as separated from all the civil relations of the poet, such a separation in the case of an oration by Demosthenes cannot be so effected in the least degree. Nothing in it is an isolated piece of art ; nothing can be torn out from the web of circumstances in which it was spoken ; only in connection with these does it constitute a unity, which again was nothing but an *act*,—a point in the political career of the orator. When the ancient orators appeared, their discourse was an action in the strictest and most common signification of the word ; an action that was none the less worthy of the name, and none the less powerful, because they made use of speech instead of limbs, weapons, or other instruments. Nay, even in our unrhetorical times, if one were to regard the discourses of a sacred orator as a series of little separate pieces of art, delivered every Sunday, everybody certainly would protest against such a view, and demand that his orations be regarded as individual attempts to influence his hearers,—as individual acts in the discharge of his calling ; whereby they would also become lost in the sum-total of his social influence. But since all the influence of man in his various relations is, or should be, under the guidance of the moral law, the practice of Eloquence—inasmuch as it is, in reality, influence of this sort—can be subjected to no other than Ethical laws. Eloquence strives to produce a change in the sentiments and conduct of other men ; the question, after its fundamental principles, therefore, becomes changed quite naturally into this : What are the laws according to which a free

being may exert influence upon other free beings? And the answer to this question can be derived only from Ethics.

We will attempt to answer it. And if it shall turn out that all the rules of Eloquence, which have been truly and correctly acknowledged as such, but which have been placed beside each other in no inward connection, can be derived from the laws, according to which a free being may exert influence upon other free beings, there will be no doubt that Rhetoric, considered as the theory of Eloquence, is a part of Ethics, and that Eloquence itself is an ability to exert influence according to ethical laws—that is, is a Virtue.

In this way, moreover, the perplexity will be removed in which Theorizers find themselves when they would determine whether Eloquence is an art or not, and generally, what it is in reality. They cannot declare it to be an art, since it is plain that it aims at the attainment of an outward end, and not at a free and uninterested representation of the Beautiful. To the level of a trade, however, it cannot be degraded; hence a distinction is made between fine and non-fine, æsthetic and non-æsthetic, arts; strange expressions and difficult to be understood!* Into this latter class Eloquence is thrown, with the additional remark, that it merits the name of an art, in so far as we connect with this term the conception of a practised and cultivated capacity and ability to produce works whose individual parts in their closest connection unite for

* Schott's Theory of Eloquence, 1807, p. 17. Fundamental Principles of Rhetoric and Homiletics, by the same, 1815, p. 420.—A condensed summary of the first mentioned work of Schott, by Prof. Park, may be found in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.—Tr.

one and the same end.' Under this conception, however, belongs also every ability of a mechanical kind, and hence nothing is added to the dignity of Eloquence by such a distinction. But if the view of Eloquence brought forward by us can be maintained, not only a much more settled and definite place would be secured to it, but also a place in the highest degree honorable. It would belong to that which is highest among men, to Virtue ; and could be called an Art only in so far as the name of Art could be given to Virtue itself.

But in saying that Eloquence is a virtue, it is by no means meant that a certain degree of moral excellence is enough in order to Eloquence, and that all that is usually derived from Art, Learning, and Science, can be dispensed with. It is only meant that the arrangement and definition of that which Eloquence derives to itself from these different departments, belongs peculiarly to Ethical laws ; but this is the very thing that is demanded of a highest fundamental principle. Who, for example, would deny that the imagination is the highest law-giver for the painter ? And yet no painting can be completed by the imagination alone. There is needed, besides, mechanical skill, knowledge of colors, of perspective, of anatomy, of history ; the imagination as the highest fundamental principle, merely determines how each of these knowledges and abilities shall be applied. In like manner, means of various kinds are necessary to the orator, according to the different relations which he sustains, and according to the different ends which he proposes to himself, which are to be obtained only by study and practice ; but that which determines where, how, and in what degree, each of the existing means shall be applied, is

the Ethical law, to which belongs every judgment regarding our relations, our ends, and our social influence. So that here the moral law does not merely point out the time for the action, leaving the guidance of the action to another principle, as would be the case in the practice of any particular art; but Eloquence, in all its various forms, is nothing but the development of the Ethical impulse itself.

CHAPTER V.

IDEAS.

But what is the tenor of this highest law of Eloquence, which, according to what has been said, must necessarily be an Ethical one? It does not seem to us to be necessary here to unfold from the bottom a new and peculiar system of morals; it will be sufficient to consider closely the relation which the orator sustains to the hearer. The few positions which we shall lay down, will, it is hoped, meet with a confirmatory response in the moral feeling of every cultivated man.

The orator has plans and designs which he would realize, and to this end he must first overcome the sluggishness of indifferent minds, and give them an impulse to action; and secondly, he must overcome those who openly oppose, and carry them along with him. But he has no compulsory authority at all over the minds of others; he is not a law-giver, who ordains the relations of men, and thus gives them direction in a mediate, yet sure and irresistible manner; he is not a ruler, who leads a whole people hither and thither, because he has control over the possessions, life, and standing of every individual. He stands upon a perfect equality with those upon whom he would exert an influence; and since his relation to them ensures him no open authority over their freedom, he may not surreptitiously obtain it in any secret manner; he must respect their freedom, and neither by exciting

their emotions, nor deluding their understandings, deprive them of this prerogative. The hearer who is carried away, must, at the same time, act independently also ; and while he follows the will of the orator, he must not merely believe that he is following his own will, but must actually follow it. But how is the solution of such a difficult, and, as it would seem, insoluble problem, rendered possible ? From the fact that there is something altogether universal and necessary which all men will—something which they must will, from their moral nature ; from the fact that the true freedom of man is constantly striving after the realization of certain ideas, which can be enumerated and distinctly pointed out. The orator, therefore, has satisfied all the requisitions of morality, as soon as he has carried back his present design to one of those ideas which every individual of his hearers wishes to realize. For, in this way, the freedom of one man is not destroyed by the influence of another upon him ; he only fulfils from an impulse from without, what he is constantly seeking to fulfil from an inward impulse. The highest law of Eloquence, therefore, is this :—the idea which the orator wishes to realize, is to be carried back to the necessary ideas of the hearer.

Of these necessary ideas we must now obtain a more distinct apprehension. Ideas, generally, are productive thoughts, which impel to production and action, and are themselves the germ of that which is to be produced, as well as the rule by which its form is to be constructed. As there are plastic,*

* Plastic is here used in its strict signification, to denote that which pertains to sculpture, including works both in stone and bronze.—*Tr.*

musical, poetic ideas, from which the creations in each of these spheres of art originate; so there are also ethical ideas, which are destined to be embodied in life, which lie in the reason, must be pre-supposed to be in every man considered as a being endowed with reason, and are, moreover, actually in-dwelling in every one, though not in equal clearness and liveliness. For the mind in action, these ideas flow together into one, and form a whole, which flames before it as the one highest, after which it strives, and which is capable of an outward realization in its action. But in reflection, and in verbal statement, this one highest divides into three different ideas, according as it is referred to the circumstances under which action occurs, or to the character of the subject who acts, or to the necessary inward and outward consequences of the action. Every man wills the highest, in so far as it is closely determined and conditioned by his peculiar relations; this is the Idea of Duty. Every man wills to be inclined and able to produce the highest at all times, and everywhere; this is the Idea of Virtue. Every man wills that each and every one of his actions produce a series of internal and external consequences that will render the production of the highest easier for him in future; this is the Idea of Happiness. In a word, every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself to virtue, wills to promote his own happiness.* These are the ne-

* The author here means to say that man wills to fulfil his duty, to form himself to virtue, and to promote his own real happiness, ideally—not actually. By virtue of his moral constitution, he wills and must will this, though by reason of sin he actually does not. But the orator must address man as he came from his Creator, and not as he has made himself; he must appeal to that which is highest in him, even although

cessary practical ideas which are to be met with in every man, and freedom consists only in following these ideas unconditionally.

It is plain now, in what consists the first duty of the orator. The hearer, while he is borne along, is, nevertheless, to remain free, and through the whole of his oration the orator is to carry back the idea everywhere present in it, to the necessary ideas of the hearer. He, in this way, shows them how, in order to fulfil their duty—in order to elevate themselves to virtue—in order to promote their happiness, they must also realize his propositions; how the ideas of Duty, of Virtue, of Happiness, of themselves necessarily produce this very disposition, necessarily impel them to the very conduct to which he would urge them. In this way, the orator not only respects the freedom of the hearer, but while he seems to overpower and utterly subject him, raises him, through the enlivenment of his ideas, to the very highest grade of an independent self-consciousness. It is for this reason, also, that men who abhor all compulsion, and are ready to resist all compulsory violence, love the orator and follow him gladly, because he gives them a direction, by means of ideas, the most powerful and certain, yet, at the same time, most innocent force by which men are controlled. "Whoever feels himself to be compelled," says Xenophon, "hates, as if he were deprived of some good; whoever is persuaded, loves as if he had received a benefit."*

it does not find a realization in his actual life. Only in this way can he profoundly move or elevate his hearer.—*Tr.*

* *Memor.* I. 2, 10.

CHAPTER VI.

THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS.

But only in the most general relations—relations in which men meet each other as free beings merely, and before any relation of a more limited sort has developed itself from this original relation, do the regulating ideas of the will appear as Duty, Virtue, and Happiness. Through every closer connection among men, by which that original relation is further developed and unfolded, these ideas also obtain a stricter determination, a wider unfolding, and, consequently, another name. There are, however, two relations among men which have the common aim to render easy the realization of practical ideas, and which have both been established by God, the one in a supernatural manner, the other by a necessity of nature. The first is the Church; the second is the State.

We will, in the first place, consider what form the ethical ideas assume in this latter relation. Since in the State the universal ethical law, in its application to particular cases, becomes more closely determined by positive laws and ordinances, Civil Law here comes in, in the place of Duty. Since, furthermore, in the State, the happiness of every individual consists in his activity as a citizen being unrestricted, and since this cannot be unless there is a flourishing condition of the commonwealth, the ethical idea of Happiness becomes changed into the striving after the well-being of the State.

Lastly, Virtue here comes into notice only in so far as the highest—to the production of which it is disposed and suited—also promotes the well-being of the commonwealth, and in this reference Virtue is called Merit. Civil Law, the Common Weal, and Merit, are, consequently, the necessary ideas, by which every member of State, as such, is guided in his conduct ; and the first duty of the orator, if he is dealing with his hearers as members of a State, consists in showing them how, through the execution of that which he proposes, Civil Law will be obeyed, the Common Weal will be promoted, and Civic Merit will be acquired.

But these ideas attain a perfect unfolding, neither in the general ethical relations, nor in the particular political, since in these they remain shut up within the sphere of the earthly, which can never satisfy man, from his very nature. They acquire their highest dignity only through religion, and through their reference to the Deity, who imparts this reference to them. Hence they appear in the Church, where the Christian, as such, exercises an influence upon the Christian, regards his own activity as an efflux from the Deity, or as a striving to return back into Him, and thereby imparts to these ideas an actuating power, both for himself and others, of which they are always destitute when man does not rise above and beyond his own individuality.

In the Church, however, a divine institution, and under divine guidance, the human reason cannot be regarded as the highest law-giver ; God alone is the supreme law-giver who speaks to us through his natural word in the Conscience, and his revealed word in the Gospel, and gives us a rule of con-

duet ; what, therefore, this commands in a particular instance, is not merely Duty, (an idea that carries man back no further than to himself merely,) but the Will of God. Furthermore, when the Christian contemplates that disposition of the soul which is constantly applying itself to good works, and is able to perform them, he cannot possibly stop at mere Virtue ; for this denotes that degree of moral perfection to which man can raise himself—which he can attain by a constant struggle with sin. But the Christian knows of something higher ; he beholds moral perfection as it reigns, without struggle, and without conflict, in the divine Being ; and hence this perfect condition of the soul can, for him, consist only in resemblance to God, or, since the invisible God has become man, and has lived and acted in human relationships, in resemblance to Christ. Happiness, again, he cannot possibly seek in a series of states and conditions, each one of which renders the production of the highest good, easier in the next following ; instead of this, his eye, pressing forward into eternity, beholds the final goal to which this series conducts—namely, intimate union with God, or Blessedness ; he, therefore, as his guiding idea, chooses this alone, which is the goal, and not Happiness, which conceived of in its highest ethical purity, can yet constitute only the way to this goal.

Hence, when an orator contemplates himself and his hearers as members of the Church, his first duty consists in bringing the Idea which he would impart to them, into connection with the Ideas which he must necessarily presuppose in them ; and these, according to the foregoing, are the Will of God, Resemblance to God, Blessedness. If no one of these is

prominent in a sermon, as the point from which everything is viewed, so much is certain at least—the sermon does not belong to the sphere of Eloquence. It is not conceivable, however, why the sacred orator should deem it unworthy of his office to be at home in this sphere of Eloquence, since according to what has been said before, Eloquence is not only the most innocent of all influences, but is Virtue itself. It has shown itself to be such thus far, and, it is hoped, will prove itself to be such, still more, in what is to follow.

I must here beg my readers to carefully note a result which flows with the greatest certainty from the investigation thus far, the truth of which, however, has never been strictly proved, nay, has been doubted by most—namely, that ecclesiastical Eloquence is entirely one and the same with political, as to its Ideas, *i. e.*, as to its nature.

In saying this, however, we do not deny that they differ from one another in their outward form, in an important degree; for Church and State are very different relationships, and relationships always exert a material influence upon every species of moral activity.*

It is apparent furthermore, that even if it be granted that the political and judicial Eloquence of the Ancients has perished, still only one form of the thing, and not the very thing

* Herder says in his letters upon the study of Theology, (letter 40,) "Whoever takes the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, as an absolute model for his sermons, has no true conception either of a sermon or of a judicial oration; he does not understand the true end of either." True, if he makes them an *absolute* model. But as I have presented the matter, this objection would not, it is hoped, apply to my view.

itself, has perished; for this has risen again in Ecclesiastical Eloquence with a still higher splendor; the Ideas upon which Eloquence is based have been made more splendid by passing through the medium of Religion, and whatever deficiency modern Eloquence may have in perfection of form, when compared with ancient, it is compensated for by the superiority of its subject-matter, while, at the same time, it is to be remembered that perfection in the outward form is far more easily attained when the subject is of a less elevated nature, than when it is of the absolutely highest. Finally, it is apparent, that even if it be granted that Ecclesiastical Eloquence itself has disappeared, as is actually asserted by some, still Eloquence itself is not destroyed, but must be sought for in the intercourse of men, in their daily society. In a word, Eloquence is eternal, for it rests upon that which is eternal in man—upon his ethical Ideas.*

* L'éloquence peut se trouver dans les entretiens et dans tout genre d'écrire. Elle est rarement, où on la cherche, et elle est quelquefois où on ne la cherche point.—*La Bruyère.*

CHAPTER VII.

THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE.

ALTHOUGH all three of these Ideas may be employed very properly on one and the same occasion, as motive grounds, yet most commonly, the aim of the orator has a more easy reference to one of them, which is then predominant, and to which the others, when they are employed, are subordinated. This circumstance led the Ancients to assume three species of orations, of which one has Legality and Illegality, another, Public Advantage and Public Detriment, and the third, Civic Merit and Civic Demerit, for its subject-matter. The first is the oration before the court of justice ; the second, the deliberative or political oration ; the third, the panegyrical or demonstrative oration. Correct as this division is, the Ancients have nevertheless, so far as I am aware, given no satisfactory ground for it, as indeed they were in general well fitted for comprehending and distinguishing the Actual, but were less successful in referring it to its higher principles. For that which Aristotle, from whom the later Rhetoricians derive this division,* offers in its justification,† has in truth more resemblance to a jest, however earnest he may have been in it. There are, says he, as many species of orations as there are

* Quintil. III, 4.

† Rhetor. I, 3. Cicero derives this division in the same way. De Partitione, c. III.

species of hearers; but the hearer is either a spectator or a judge, and this latter again, in respect to the Future, and in respect to the Past; hence there arise the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial orations. This supposition, of a hearer who is merely a spectator, is most remarkable. The demonstrative orations of the Sophists, (*i. e.*, discourses having no other aim but to strike by the jingle of words,) were indeed listened to with applause in the time of Aristotle; but this must be regarded only as a piece of bad taste, and not as a natural impulse in man, upon which to build philosophically. Furthermore, although the relations in which the hearers usually stood to the orator in the ancient Republics, are imperfectly indeed denoted by this passing of judgment on the Past or the Future, yet it is by no means shown thereby, that there were only so many and could be no more of such relations.*

On the contrary, if these three species of orations are placed beside the three Ideas above-mentioned, it is apparent that these are the only ground upon which the division in question rests. For since among the Ancients, only the political relation reached any good degree of perfection, these Ideas could be actualized among them only under the form of the Legal and the Illegal, the Weal and the Detriment of the State, Civic Merit and its contrary, and this very relation is also assigned as the subject-matter of the three species.

If divisions are to be made at all in Eloquence, the different species cannot be determined by a reference to the Form

* That also does not seem to be satisfactory which occurs to Quintilian, *cuncta rimanti*, III, 4.

and Matter, and to the manner in which both interpenetrate each other ; in Poetry this can be done ; in Eloquence it cannot be,* for the reason, that the Form and the Matter vary with the relations which the orator and the hearer sustain, and these relations are too numerous to be specified. The leading Ideas are the permanent in Eloquence, the only thing which does not change ; and on this account, they of themselves alone furnish a ground of division.

If these three species constitute a valid division in political Eloquence, they must be found in sacred Eloquence also, since the fundamental Ideas are the same in both. To counsel for the well-being of the State, and to point out the way to eternal well-being, is a moral activity of one and the same kind ; as also there is no practical difference between accusing a criminal and inveighing against a vice, between praising a meritorious man and recommending a virtue. It is only to be regretted that the names by which the Ancients designated these species are suited to political Eloquence alone ; and it could be wished, that appellations of an entirely general character might be introduced, which could be applied indiscriminately to both political and sacred Eloquence.

That species of oration which is based upon the Idea of Virtue was developed latest ; it first received its complete unfolding through the Church, to which the State was always unfavorable. For this reason, also, this species was never known among the Ancients in its purity. Aristotle apprehends it merely on the side of the praise and

*. *Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum. Id secus est.*

Cicero de optimo genere oratorum, c. I.

blame which it dispenses, and makes it a demonstrative oration without any practical aim. Cicero, who adheres closely to this same view, doubts whether it can be regarded as a species at all, and whether it is necessary to give rules concerning it.* And contemplated from this point of view, it certainly does not belong to Eloquence. If a writer praises and censures with no other purpose but to praise and to censure, productions of two kinds can arise: a Lyrical Poem, if the writer surrenders himself to his feelings; or an historical representation, if he follows the thread of a narrative. It will be an oration only in case the purpose to awaken a certain disposition in the hearer,—to determine him to a certain course of conduct, is connected with the praise and the censure. The Idea of Virtue is employed in this way certainly by the Ancients; yet it is seldom predominant, and commonly is subordinate merely, as when Demosthenes places before the Athenians the example of their forefathers as an incitement to great deeds, or pictures the worthlessness of an opponent in order to give greater weight to his defence or accusation.

A peculiar species of oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, was first formed in the Christian Church; here the moral perfection, which is conceived of as being in God, which was manifested in Christ, after which whole companies of saints strove, was exhibited to believers for imitation. With the panegyrical oration in praise of the saints, was soon conjoined the funeral oration, which is also constructed upon the Idea of Virtue, and which deserves the name of an oration only when, through commendation of the deceased, it seeks to

* *De Oratore*, II, c. 11.

impel the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. Every department of Literature, nevertheless, has its limits, where it borders upon some other; thus this species of oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transition from Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one hand, and to Historical Representation on the other. For this reason, the greatest care is requisite in the orator at this point, in order not to lose himself in one or the other. It would be forgetfulness of the relations in which he stands to his hearers, and, consequently, contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their benefit, he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or should follow out a Historical Representation; either of which may be done only so far as it contributes to the attainment of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowledge, for the orator to describe his hero with some good degree of completeness, and still bring all under such a practical point of view as that he can be sure of exerting an influence upon the hearer. Yet the solution of this problem is not impossible, as the great models show.

CHAPTER VIII.

VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE.

In case the orator satisfies the requisitions of duty, by referring the end he has in view to the ethical Ideas of the hearer, the question arises, whether this course is also in accordance with good sense, and whether there are not other and far more effectual means of gaining entrance to men's minds, and of giving them a direction. Should this be found to be the case—should it be found that the orator in reality has only to choose between acting contrary to good sense, by following out moral principles, or acting contrary to good morals, by following out the rules of good sense, we must then give up the design of giving a systematic form to the Theory of Eloquence, since nothing is capable of a systematic form which is either essentially incomplete in itself, or stands in open contradiction to one of the fundamental impulses in man—the moral. But, furthermore, this question itself could not even arise, if the science of morals were only a little more developed than, alas, it actually is, although man has been employed in its unfolding for so many centuries. We should, in that case, see that Ethics, since it includes the whole conduct of man, must also furnish the means requisite to attain rational ends; that it cannot exist at all as a science,—that there can be, absolutely, no conduct in conformity with principles, if the same laws which prescribe our actions do not, at

the same time, also point out the way and means whereby they will best succeed. In accordance, however, with views now prevailing, we hear much of good sense, as an attribute which often leads aside from the path of morals, and which, in its resources, shrewdly derived from experience and personal observation, furnishes us the surest means of attaining our ends. Whether this is so or not, I leave undecided ; but that for the orator the moral action is also good sense—i. e., is the true way of attaining his ends—is already apparent, from the investigation thus far. For we have found this to be a law—namely, that the orator must make his design subserve the moral Ideas of his hearers, otherwise he must not attempt to give them a direction. But so very much is Virtue one with good sense, that this very reference to the moral Ideas of the hearer is the only infallible means of giving him a direction. Will one here say, “No ! the orator must address himself to the passions of men ; he must make use of them where he finds them excited ; he must arouse them where he cannot pre-suppose their existence, for only in this way are minds and hearts swayed. Who will deny that they are not very often swayed in this way, and that a practised orator, who understands how to inflame the passions, is able to get the victory over a less practised orator, who aims only to awaken moral Ideas ?” The case, however, must not be stated in this way, but we must imagine two men of equal talents, one of whom takes hold of the hearer in the way prescribed by us, on the side of his moral Ideas—that is, on his stronger side,—and the other of whom endeavors to seize him by his weak side, to corrupt, to blind, to deceive him ; the

first, I affirm, will always succeed, the second will always fail.

And, indeed, for this reason—because by virtue of his human nature, moral Ideas are in-dwelling in every individual hearer, while, on the contrary, the possession of a human nature does not imply that man is controlled at all times by passion, or even that he is peculiarly liable to be. Consequently, if the orator pre-supposes the presence of passion, it is very possible for him to be mistaken ; and if the orator endeavors to excite passion, such an undertaking is always very doubtful, since a firm point to which he can fasten is wanting. This point, on the contrary, is always found, and the orator is always sure to awaken interest, so soon as he claims to have morality on his side.

Secondly, even supposing that the passions exist as generally in the hearer as the moral Ideas, yet these latter possess this advantage over the former, that they are the same in all, while the passions, on the contrary, are different in each individual. But the orator cannot address himself to each particular individual ; one and the same effect is to be produced in the most diverse minds by one and the same oration. Now, how wanting in good sense would the orator be, if he should neglect the universal interest grounded in human nature, in order to speak of the particular interest grounded in a passion which could affect only some particular minds, and with respect to which the most would be cold and indifferent !

In the third place, in addition to this, a very true remark, and one that is very much to the honor of man, applies here—namely, that taken singly, men may, indeed, be full of little

passions ; but so soon as they are collected in great masses, each one seems to give up the base portion of his individuality, in order to preserve the purely human in it, which is always good. When man loses himself in a multitude, he is no longer the narrow-hearted creature governed by desire and self-seeking ; but his interests melt in with those of all the others, and, consequently, cannot be other than pure and noble. The greater, therefore, the assemblage is, the more large-minded must the orator be, or it is all over with him.

Nay, even the deception which is so often employed by popular orators, proves that a direction can be imparted to men only by means of moral Ideas ; for how does the orator succeed even in this case ? By no means by appealing to Avarice or Revenge, directly, and endeavoring to inflame these passions ; for no one has ever been able to carry away a great multitude by this means. On the contrary, the art of the deceiver of the people has ever consisted in clothing the desires growing out of their particular passions in the garb of requirements, based upon the universal moral Ideas. Thus the Demagogues in the French Revolution were able to bring about their great results only by concealing their selfish designs under the Ideas of Justice, the Common Weal—*i. e.*, under moral Ideas ; and they could not but succeed, for owing to the misfortune of the times, there were none who were able to exhibit these Ideas in their pure form with equal force. But that the pure moral Ideas, when they are presented with power, gain the victory, (even in the most frivolous and corrupt minds,) over that false play with Ideas, the case of Demosthenes proves, who beat down his opponent, not merely by

means of his massive Style and his perfect Declamation, but mainly by means of the purity of his Will, and the power of his moral Ideas.

Fourthly, it is to be remembered that every hearer is by nature suspicious, particularly when he perceives that the right to influence his mind is claimed, and when he reflects that he should yield himself up only to one who appears to him to be an honest man. It is for this reason, also, that teachers of Rhetoric attach so much importance to the way in which the speaker appears to the hearer, and to the first impression which the hearer receives from the orator. But nothing is so difficult as to play the honest man, and one is far more readily taken for an honest man, if he really is one. For the consciousness of being in the right imparts a coloring to the style, and an emphasis to the tone, which an evil conscience can imitate only in part, never perfectly; and the morally bad which peers through, will always induce a suspiciousness in the hearer, which renders him less susceptible to influence. Hence, when Rousseau advised a young and afterwards very distinguished French advocate, Loiseau de Mauleon, to undertake the defence of only such causes as he was convinced were just, this was a Rhetorical rule, for the very reason that it was an ethical rule, and adapted to promote, in the same degree, both Integrity and Eloquence.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SUBORDINATE IDEAS OR CATEGORIES.

The orator, in this moral striving to connect his particular Ideas with the universal and necessary Ideas of his hearers, is liable to meet with obstacles of three different kinds. First, there are the obscure and undeveloped conceptions which the hearer forms of the nature of things, whereby he may be prevented from recognizing something which the orator holds out (as *e. g.*, Duty, Virtue, or Happiness,) as really being such, and so from taking it up into his own Ideas. Secondly, the hearer, from a defective knowledge of existing relations, and of the present state of things, may be in doubt whether an Idea, from which in other respects he does not dissent, is practicable. Lastly, the hearer may form a different opinion with respect to the actual reality of a matter to which the orator would apply one of the higher Ideas, or, to speak generally, may not be convinced of its real historical existence. Hence arises the necessity for the orator, first, to instruct the hearer in the true nature and quality of things; secondly, to make clear to him the practicability of the proposed undertaking; thirdly, to show him that the matter in question has been actually realized, or to convince him of its historical certainty. Hence arise, for the theory of Eloquence, three subordinate Ideas, or Categories, as I would rather call them: Truth, Possibility, Actuality. And here it is evident that

moral attributes alone do not suffice for the management of these Categories, but that Philosophic culture, and a great compass of solid knowledge, is requisite. If it is asked by what right, then, we bring these Categories into a theory of Eloquence grounded upon ethical principles, I would reply: Because the moral maxim, that the orator should refer his particular Idea to the universal Ideas of the hearer, can be followed out, only in case the doubts, or false views of the hearer, in relation to the categories, Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, are removed; and this work, since it is under the guidance of a moral principle, must also be regarded as moral in its nature. And secondly, because the orator, in case he did not possess the scientific culture and the substantial knowledge which are requisite, would be morally obligated to attain them, since they are the necessary means, in order to the execution of a moral undertaking. The orator, even if he acquires Philosophic culture and Historical knowledge, to the full extent permitted and required by the highest ethical principles, does not thereby become a Philosopher or Historian, but must ever be regarded as one whose sphere is action, and who seeks to exert an influence externally.

CHAPTER X.

THE CATEGORY, TRUTH.

If we should make Truth—*i. e.*, the exhibition of the essential nature of things—the ultimate end in Eloquence, Eloquence would thereby become entirely identical with Philosophy. But we regard it only as a subordinate Category, to which the higher moral Ideas lead. In this way Eloquence maintains its ethical character, and at the same time its affinity with Philosophy is explained.

It is therefore allowable, and oftentimes necessary, for the orator to philosophize, whether the need of the Truth, as such, becomes apparent only after the conflict between the practical Ideas of the orator and the hearer has begun—in which case, Truth merely furnishes the intermediate positions by which the former are the more easily made to harmonize with the latter; or whether the orator begins with the exhibition of the Truth—a thing that may be done if it accords with the aim and the circumstances of the orator, and if the moral impulse from which it originates and the moral design for which it is done, are plainly to be seen. Then this impulse itself and this design will set the bounds within which the Rhetorical presentation of Truth must be kept, and by which it is distinguished from the Philosophical, which aims at the mere developement of Ideas without reference to anything farther.

The exhibition of Truth is an object of prime importance

in sacred Eloquence, and is one of the characteristics by which it is specially distinguished from secular Eloquence. In secular Eloquence, only one deed, one single resolve, is sought to be produced by the orator. This determines, and of necessity limits very narrowly, all that belongs to the mere developement of a subject and the mere informing of the mind. The problem of the sacred orator, on the contrary, is—to conduct man to eternal life through the knowledge of God and of His Son, and to mould his spirit in such a way that not merely one good deed, but a complete change of the inner man, and a whole series of good deeds, may be the result. Reflections upon human nature and its relation to God, so far as they are referred back to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, are therefore perfectly in place in the sacred oration.

Nevertheless, the Rhetorical presentation of Truth is entirely different from the Philosophical; for, in Philosophy, Truth is moulded wholly, and on all sides, in a statuesque manner, so to speak, so that as in the case of a statue, there is no particular point of view, no perspective, for it, but it presents a perfect form to the beholder wherever he stands. In Eloquence, on the contrary, Truth appears only in a picturesque manner, and in profile, so to speak, for the orator presents only so much of it to the hearer, as is necessary to convince him, and as the theme requires. While, therefore, Duty commands the orator to strive after scientific culture, it also bids him to forget and sacrifice all the sensible, profound, and excellent thought he may have upon a topic, if it is not indispensably necessary to the attainment of his end.

impel the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. Every department of Literature, nevertheless, has its limits, where it borders upon some other; thus this species of oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transition from Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one hand, and to Historical Representation on the other. For this reason, the greatest care is requisite in the orator at this point, in order not to lose himself in one or the other. It would be forgetfulness of the relations in which he stands to his hearers, and, consequently, contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their benefit, he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or should follow out a Historical Representation; either of which may be done only so far as it contributes to the attainment of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowledge, for the orator to describe his hero with some good degree of completeness, and still bring all under such a practical point of view as that he can be sure of exerting an influence upon the hearer. Yet the solution of this problem is not impossible, as the great models show.

CHAPTER VIII.

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ficulty gain him over to a salutary truth; and because, on the contrary, the finest philosophical explication would perhaps only weary him and render him indifferent to his own true well-being and the practical aim of my oration. Hence, if an orator in the expression of his Ideas, seeks to please himself simply, and for this reason forgets his hearers and the end which he has or should have in view, I affirm that this is not only contrary to good sense, since he can never in this way attain his end, but it is also contrary to morality—it is reprehensible self-seeking. And the evidence that it is contrary to morality, is found in the very fact, that it defeats his undertaking. For the orator, with all his powers, is now in the Ethical domain, and consequently, that which aids these powers must be morally good, and that which thwarts them must be morally bad. The distinctive character therefore, of oratorical discourse, is *Popularity*, using the term in its highest sense; and the orator is to join on upon the Truth as it exists among the mass of the people, and to esteem the general form in which he finds it here, more highly than that particular form which he has given to it in his Philosophical system.

If, however, there should be no one among the Ideas of the hearer which the orator can employ as the basis of his argumentation, then, since a scientific investigation is entirely forbidden him, he must betake himself to human or divine Authority. And, indeed, nothing is more frequent than the employment of the former of these in speeches upon legal cases and affairs of state. If the orator thinks that the enlivenment of the Ethical Ideas of the judge is not sufficient in order to

obtain from him the desired decision, he cites the Authority of the law ; and if an opinion which is being maintained is not in accordance with the conceptions of a political assemblage, it must then be shown that, in a similar case, a statesman of acknowledged wisdom thought or spoke in the very same way.

To sacred Eloquence, in particular, Authority, and indeed a divine Authority, is so necessary, that this species of Eloquence would not have arisen, and, even now, cannot exist, without it. The highest of all truths—those pertaining to the relation of God to man—are here presented to view, in order to serve as a guide to man in his striving after Happiness, and as motives to sanctification. Even granting, what, however, is not to be granted, that these truths can be reached by Philosophie Deduction alone, yet this method is not to be followed by the orator ; for, although knowledge, indeed, might be imparted in this way, yet all the practical benefits of knowledge would be lost, or, at best, would be but scantily reaped. Furthermore, neither the Authority of the hearer, nor that of any man whatever, is a sufficient foundation upon which to base truths of such importance, and which lie entirely beyond the ordinary field of view. They need, therefore, a divine Authority, when they are employed in public discourse, to promote the sanctification and blessedness of men. It was for this reason that, among the Ancients, who were destitute of a positive Revelation, not even a purely moral Eloquence could be developed along with political Eloquence, notwithstanding the high degree of excellence which characterises their ethical systems, and that a religio-moral Eloquence did not appear until Christianity appeared. This

species of Eloquence rises and sets according as Faith in a divine Revelation grows stronger or weaker ; and, from the very nature of the case, in proportion as the sacred orator loses the conviction of the divine Authority of the Bible, his Eloquence, also, must lose in Power and Dignity. Let one imagine to himself a pulpit orator endowed with the finest talents, but who places his own individual reason not beneath, but above Revelation, and who, consequently, in determining the relations which God sustains to man, and which men should sustain to each other, can appeal to no higher divine Authority. If the predominant bent of his mind is Philosophic, he will make it his principal business to exhibit, to explain, and, as far as possible, to demonstrate, the principles of his religious and ethical systems. Now, passing over the objection to such an undertaking, that it is ordinarily not suited to the average degree of culture in a promiscuous assembly, I ask what, at most, can be the result, even supposing that the hearer rightly apprehends all the views of the speaker ? Scientific culture, indeed ; but the improvement of the heart and life of the hearer, and not scientific culture, was the design of the orator, and he must miss of this, since his whole time has been taken up in the endeavor to establish certain truths, and none is left, to connect them with the higher practical Ideas of the hearer. He will, perhaps, attempt to do this in the conclusion ; but if the whole of the oration, up to the conclusion, has not been planned with the design to awaken moral interest, the orator will in vain labor after this in the application of his discourse.

Furthermore, it seems to me that one can never have so

firm and unshaken confidence in the religious and practical views which he derives from a human system, be it his own or another's, as in those truths which, having acknowledged a revelation, he receives on its Authority. Hence, there will always be in the minds of pulpit orators who are skeptical respecting a Revelation, a certain embarrassment, scarcely perceived by themselves, which will betray itself in their presentation of Truth, now by a cold, indifferent tone, now by unnatural effort and distorted zeal; and thus the truths presented by them, however excellent they may be, will never acquire the influence over the feelings and the will which a calmer, more powerful emphasis would have imparted.

But what carries this embarrassment to the highest pitch, and must, in the utmost degree, weaken the Rhetorical power of a pulpit orator in the exhibition of truth, is the obscure feeling which will certainly press upon him, that, considering the relation which he sustains to his hearer, there is something contrary to uprightness in such a way of thought; and this not merely because he is acting contrary to the designs of the State and the Church, who have appointed him to proclaim, not his own individual and human opinions, but divine truth—although this seems to me to be a very well-grounded scruple—but principally because his office invests him with a dignity and respect which must appear as unwarrantable assumption in the case of every one who does not found his teaching on divine Authority. It is true, indeed, that when a man appears before other men, in order to prosecute the guilty, or defend the innocent, or to propose measures for the Common Weal, he needs no impulse from above, and no divine

Authority, in order to do this. But it is difficult to understand how a man, with no basis but his own strength alone, and not regarding himself as the ambassador of a higher being, can dare to point out to his fellow-men, this, as the road to salvation, and that, as the road to perdition, and now, to urge them on by the prospect of the punishment and retributions of a future world, and now, to hold them back. He can acquire the right to do this only through a wisdom and virtue higher than human; and who will venture to ascribe these perfections to himself? The higher the degree in which he does really possess them, the greater, it seems to me, must be his dread of being made vain, even in his feelings, by appearing in public. Moreover, he sees among his hearers persons who are his equals in moral and scientific culture, or, it may be, his superiors. Feeling as though, in this case, it would be unbecoming to seize with a strong grasp upon their minds, he seeks to say to his little public only what is pathetic, agreeable and entertaining; and if he describes a vice, he gives them to understand that he does not suspect any one of his hearers, but has in his eye certain other persons who are out of their circle. Emotion is everything for him, and the awakening of Feeling that comes to nothing; he seeks to be brilliant by means of external attractions and an ornamental style;* and thus his discourses are deprived of power and usefulness by his skepticism.

Let one, on the contrary, imagine to himself a sacred orator of less talent, but who, to a sincere will to do good, joins

* Un clerc mondain ou irréligieux, s'il monte en chaire, est déclamateur.—*La Bruyère.*

an unshaken belief in the truths of the Christian religion; and let him see what a higher elevation and sweep his discourses will receive from this single circumstance. While he derives the sublimest truths from the Holy Scriptures, where they are given to him in the clearest, most popular form, he is, at the same time, through the divine Authority of the Bible, raised above all prolix developments and arguments, and without troubling himself about them, can apply his whole power to directly impressing the minds of his hearers. The truths exhibited by him will be the more readily believed, since he himself speaks only because he believes, and since his firm inward conviction gives an equally calm and moving emphasis to his tone, before which all doubt must disappear. With all the humility produced by a sense of the weakness of the human reason, as well as of his own moral deficiencies, he yet feels that, without assumption, he may address instruction, rebuke and exhortation to his equals, nay, to those better and wiser than himself, since he speaks to them, not in his own, but in God's name; and since as an ambassador of the Highest, he is raised above every one, be he who he may. Since, therefore, the design of the sacred orator to lead to Virtue and Happiness through the knowledge of the truth, is to be attained only through his belief in Revelation; since without this, the relation which he sustains to his hearers has not even a moral validity, it is plain that belief in Revelation in his case, must not only be regarded as a religious characteristic, but as a moral excellence also, and should be strictly required in him. It is in this connection the more mournful to notice, that so many, from a groundless fear of giving displea-

sure by recognizing a divine Authority, either conceal their belief in it altogether, or else give only timid utterance to it, and thereby deprive their discourses of power, dignity, usefulness, and consequently in the end, of the approbation of the public also.

To him who is animated by the lofty desire of rivalling the political Eloquence of the Greeks, and of speaking from the pulpit with Demosthenean power, I would say “ Science, Learning, Style, Delivery, these all render easier the practice of Eloquence, but do not make the orator. Demosthenes became an orator through the greatness and solidity of his character, and these qualities are indispensable to you too, in order to the attainment of your aim ; but they are not all you need. Though the greatest perfection attainable here, were yours, yet you are not free from human weakness, and who gives you the right to proclaim salvation or damnation to your brethren, who are not worse than yourself ? This difficulty you will feel ; you will not venture to speak to them with power ; you will be compelled to content yourself with exciting their emotions, or enriching their stores of information with new views ; you will perhaps, for a time, be listened to with applause by a mixed assembly ; but the abiding, eternal renown—the salutary, ever-onward-rolling influence of your efforts, is gone. You are weak and fearful so long as you would rest upon yourself ; dare to regard yourself as the organ of a higher Being, and you are all power and all courage. Faith plants you firm and sure ; your teaching is no longer that of the Pharisees—unmeaning sound, and useless hair-splitting ; you teach with power, like Jesus himself—for he

spake the words of His Father, and you speak His. Appropriate each and every one of His words, as well as those which His spirit gave to His Apostles; but take them in the very sense in which they spake them. You do not believe it now, but your own experience will soon teach you, that in the doctrines of our religion lies hidden all the power of sacred Eloquence."

Would that many might understand me, and through Eloquence be led to Christianity! A great honor for Eloquence, and a glorious gain for Christianity! For were it not as well and fitting to attain to Christian faith through Eloquence, as by the ordinary way of adversity and suffering?

CHAPTER XII.

THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY.

As the higher Rhetorical Ideas lead the orator to the Category Truth—*i. e.*, to the exhibition of the nature of things,—they also frequently demand the proof of the possibility and actual existence of a thing. And hence, in addition to Truth, Possibility and Actuality come into view as subordinate Rhetorical Ideas, or Categories.

The Idea of Possibility is employed in a special manner in the oration before deliberative bodies. In this case, however apparent the benefits are that accrue from the execution of the proposed undertaking, yet the courage of the hearer often falls on reflecting how difficult the undertaking is, and his indolence intrenches itself, so to speak, behind the objection that it is impossible. This objection must be removed, and the orator must show clearly the practicability of his proposition. As the hindrances which seem to stand in his way disappear, one after another, the Ethical Idea in the hearer acquires Vitality and Force, and begins to impel him to action. Demosthenes would have employed all ethical motives in vain, in order to incite the Athenians to resist Philip, if he had not also, at the same time, made clear to them the practicability of his proposition, and the Possibility of success. We see what an amount of solid knowledge is requisite in the orator, how he must have thoroughly examined all the rela-

tions of the State, and have calculated all its resources, in order to acquit himself well in respect to this point. It does not belong to my plan to mention all the cases which the Idea of Possibility includes; and I content myself with remarking—in accordance with my main design—that this Idea, however weighty and important it may be, is yet subordinate to the Ethical Idea of State-weal. For only through this is the orator led to the consideration of the Possibility of a thing; and he can have no finer impelling motive to attain all the knowledge requisite for this, than that love of country by which he is inspired.

Moreover, this Idea is found in sacred Eloquence also. Those acquainted with the human heart know how often we endeavor to quiet our conscience, when it brings to our notice our neglected duties, by the excuse that it was impossible for us to perform them. Hence, it is not enough for the orator to recommend a particular action as belonging to an ethically perfect course of conduct; he must so understand mankind generally, and the condition of society around him, as to be able to enter into an examination of all their relations, and to show that that which he advocates, is, in the highest degree, adapted to their relations. In this way, the high religious Ideas are taken out of their abstract and universal forms, and put into the concrete and definite forms of human life; and nothing imparts a more active life to the Ideas of the hearer, than this full unfolding of them, and nothing seizes more powerfully upon his mind. But a strong will is needed on the part of the orator, in order to compel the very same spirit which has soared up to the highest objects of thought, to de-

scend suddenly to the minutest detail of human life, without thereby losing its fire and elasticity. Few are able to do this, and hence, since it is easier, the orator often deems it more befitting to roam about among abstract and formless Ideas.

The category of Actuality is of peculiar importance in the judicial oration ; for although the sentence of the law, respecting a particular act—that of murder, *e. g.*—is not a matter of doubt in the least, yet the act itself sometimes is, and its Actuality can be affirmed or denied. Here the wide field of narrative-proof and statement opens to the orator ; a part of Rhetoric upon which the issue of a cause depends, and which the Ancients consequently cultivated with great care. Yet, however important it may be, the ethical Idea of Civil Law presides over it ; without this Idea, the question respecting the Actuality of a thing, would not arise in Eloquence, and it must ever be kept in view as the last goal to which the narrative-statement tends. Hence no objection against the ethical principle laid down by us as the foundation of Eloquence, can be brought from the fact that the Historical element predominates in this species of oration ; for the oration, before the court, still remains a moral procedure, in accordance with the Idea of positive Law, although this latter leads directly to the notion and exhibition of the Actuality of a thing.

This subordinate Idea is also found in sacred as well as in political Eloquence. In this department, it exists in very close connection with the category Truth, the latter category very commonly leading to the former. For it is a peculiarity of Christianity that it establishes the Truth, not by means of

Demonstration, but by means of Facts—as, *e. g.*, the Love of God, by the sacrifice of His Son; immortality, by the Resurrection of Christ. If these Facts are doubted, they must be shown to be actual by means of a historical examination of witnesses. Such investigations are of the greatest interest, because the Truth established thereby stands in such close connection with the highest practical Ideas—with Duty, Happiness, and Virtue. Furthermore, to this category belong those passages, whether in political or sacred oratory, in which the quality of a person, or a thing, is described, in order to apply to it one of the higher Ideas.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION.

By laying down the Rhetorical Ideas and Categories, we have, as it were, measured off the domain of Eloquence, and found the *materiel* on which it labors. By contemplating, therefore, these Ideas in their first movement, we also become acquainted with the Form, in its first and most general features, which the Rhetorical *materiel* assumes. This is the doctrine of the Plan and Division of an oration, respecting which, ordinarily very good and correct, but, for the most part, merely logical, rules are given, which, consequently, relate only to the Form; teaching, it is true, how to distinguish the Good from the Bad in the Form, but not pointing out the way to find the former, and avoid the latter. We wish here to unite both, and to investigate this *materiel*, not only in a formal, but also in a real manner. We must needs succeed, since we conceive of Eloquence as a procedure according to Ideas, in which Ideas the Matter as well as the Form of that which is to be produced, is contained; since, consequently, we never separate the Form from the Matter, and are, therefore, enabled to determine on this theory, not only *how* the division is to be made, but also *what* is to be divided.

Let us, therefore, imagine to ourselves a man who possesses the ability to bring out ethical Ideas into his consciousness in great Power and Vitality, and who is animated with the de-

sire to represent these Ideas in the Actual, or rather to mould the Actual into conformity with these Ideas. Such an one can employ, for this purpose, no other means than the Ideas themselves, and their expression in language ; and he knows that his undertaking will succeed only in case he is not subservient to the passions of his hearer, but rather subjects himself to the Ideas of the hearer—to that which is Highest and Best in him. He, therefore, brings his hearer before his mind, at first with merely the main features of his ethical nature, and with those requisitions which every man imposes upon himself—viz., to fulfil his Duty, to form himself to Virtue, to lay a foundation for Happiness. When he addresses members of the State or Church, he conceives these Ideas in the particular form given to them by each of these relations. Every citizen, the political orator pre-supposes, desires to have Law and Justice administered, the Common Weal promoted, and to acquire personal Merit ; every Christian, the sacred orator pre-supposes, desires to fulfil the Law of God, to raise himself to Likeness with Him, and to become capable of Eternal Blessedness. That these Ideas are leading Ideas in each and every hearer, the orator pre-supposes ; but even if he is mistaken—even if no one of them, in any one of the above specified forms, exists in the hearers—a thing which we affirm to be impossible—still this confident pre-supposition would be the best means by which to generate them ; for in proportion as men are assumed to be better than they are, and are so treated, do they become better than they are.

When the orator has thus brought the hearer before him, he will find it better adapted to his purpose, either to refer the

particular Idea of his oration to one only, of the above-mentioned Ideas, be it one of the higher or subordinate, or else to connect it with several of them. The orations constructed in the former way, I would denominate simple; those in the latter, complex. In the simple oration, Happiness, or Virtue, or Duty, is the predominating Idea, or else Truth, or Possibility, or Actuality, shaped and moulded by one of these former. In the complex oration, Truth, *e. g.*, takes the lead, and Virtue and Happiness follow; or whatever may be the order found best adapted to the particular Idea of the oration, and to the relations peculiar to it.

And now the orator makes a perfectly simple and natural beginning, by specifying his general design, and designating the Ideas or Categories, whether one or more, to which he intends to refer. This, and nothing more than this, is the Exordium. Its distinguishing characteristics are clearness and plainness. The orator announces the contest to the hearer, and tells him at what point he intends to attack him; and the hearer can well engage in it, because the fight is with honorable weapons, and the advantage is always on the side of the vanquished.

Since, among the Ancients, the subject upon which the orator wished to speak was usually known to the hearers, the Exordium—so far as it contained an announcement of the subject—must naturally be very brief; and it became more extended only when the orator wished to present himself in a more advantageous light in the existing circumstances, or to remove certain prejudices respecting himself personally, which might hinder his success. This advantage, arising from the

hearers being acquainted with the subject, and from a set occasion, is afforded to the sacred orator by the Festival days in the Christian Church, and also, to some extent, at least, by the Scripture text. For this, provided it is rightly selected, already contains the particular Idea of the orator, which needs only a slight explanation, in order to spring forth from it into plain view. Moreover, the text is often interwoven with the circumstances and relations to which it was applied at the time of its first utterance, and the orator needs only to realize them to himself, in order to discover the same or similar relations in the present time, upon which it shall exert its influence. Since, therefore, the Text specifies not only the Idea, but also the environment in which it is to unfold itself, this important advantage enables the sacred orator to abridge his exordium, especially as he does not need, like the political orator, to fill it out with assurances that his purposes are pure. For, in the first place, the whole drift and connection of his sermon, and still more of his life, is the best evidence of this; and, in the second place, since he ever appears as the ambassador of a higher Being, and never in his own name, it is not befitting in him to be anxiously careful about himself. That which so often lengthens out the Exordium is the undue employment of the subordinate Categories—the exhibition of the 'True or the Actual, *e. g.*—the orator, with the design of interesting, addressing himself to man's mere desire for knowledge, without regard to the demands of his moral nature. I cannot favor this method, and believe that it may be followed only in rare instances. For, in the first place, time is in this way spent in merely paving the way for the Idea, which might be better

employed in the developement of the Idea itself. In the second place, the preliminary representations by which the orator would prepare the way for the theme, are often as remote from the minds of the hearers as the theme itself, so that he might just as well employ this as to introduce the former. Finally, in the third place, since the mere desire for knowledge is, or should be, subordinate to the moral Interest, the orator can hardly fail to interest the hearer in his main Idea, if he connects it immediately with one of the higher moral Ideas—a thing that can be done without a long circumlocution.

At the end of the Introduction, the orator may announce the two or three parts which contain the developement proper; for why should he not carefully employ this, as well as every other opportunity, to aid the hearer's attention, and to facilitate his comprehension of the whole? If the hearer is compelled to stretch his power of attention too much, he either slackens it altogether, or else the effect of the oration is exerted on the cognitive powers alone, and not on the Will, which, for the orator's purposes, is tantamount to no effect at all.

If we do not find this practice observed in the orations of the Ancients, or any announcement of the Plan and Division, this may proceed from two reasons. First, the method to which they were obliged to accommodate themselves, was prescribed to them by the occasion on which they spoke, far more than is the case with the sacred orator, and since this method, especially in the instance of the orator before a court, was almost always one and the same, it seemed unnecessary

to announce it formally. Secondly,—and this appears to me to be the chief reason—such a formal statement of the Plan would have been evidence of study and previous preparation, the appearance of which they avoided as carefully as they sought to maintain that of Extemporizing. For they had to deal with a suspicious Public, who would have attributed such previous preparation only to the design to deceive. But the case is different with the sacred orator, who may allow the diligence which he has bestowed with an honest intention, to continually appear in his oration, since he can excite thereby in the hearer nothing but the expectation of a mass of information all the more fundamental for this. If, however, the sacred orator would, for any reason, omit the formal mention of the grounds of his oration, of the plan which he has sketched for himself, he is free to do so; for though, indeed, it is absolutely necessary that he endeavor to arrange his thoughts in the clearest and best manner, it is not absolutely necessary that he specify beforehand how he has arranged them.

But what is the principle upon which the Division of an oration should proceed? Beginning with the simple oration, this contains as many heads as there are principal positions, by which the leading design of the orator is connected with one of the higher, or one of the subordinate Ideas, as the case may be. In the sermon of Reinhardt—*e. g.*, entitled, “The worthy celebration of the Sacrament is a source of the noblest enjoyment,”—the leading design of the orator is referred solely to the Idea of Happiness, and is connected with it by the following positions: The worthy celebration of the Holy Sacra-

ment affords us a view of our Redeemer in the most affecting greatness of his character ; it wakens us to the consciousness of the highest of vocations ; it fills us with the feeling of the highest of fellowships ; it makes us alive to the most blessed of all hopes. If Duty is the single predominant Idea, the oration divides into as many heads as there are principal positions employed by the orator, to make it apparent that the state of mind, or course of conduct, recommended by him, is a Duty. If Virtue is the predominant Idea, the oration may be divided according to the different motives existing for the practice of a particular Virtue, or according to the different characteristic marks by which the particular Virtue is made to melt in, and become one with the universal Idea of Virtue.

But the simple oration may also be constructed according to one of the subordinate Ideas—Truth, Possibility, Actuality—provided only its connection with the higher Ideas is, from the very beginning, clearly and definitely established. To illustrate : the false notions which Christians form of Divine Providence, or of the efficacy of Prayer, stand in the way of their religious and moral developement ; from this point of view, instruction respecting Providence and the efficacy of Prayer, according to the Idea or Category of Truth, may be the only object of the oration. Yet, such instruction should not degenerate into a complete treatise on these subjects, but the orator should bring forward, in his refutation or indoctrination, that only which is specially important in practical respects.

In a political oration, the whole may be referred to the Idea of Possibility, in order to show that the proposition in ques-

tion, which confessedly promotes the Common-Weal is also practicable. The same may be done in sacred oratory, in order to weaken the force of excuses for committing a fault, derived from the impossibility of avoiding it, and for neglecting a virtue, from the impossibility of practising it. It is evident, moreover, that in this case the orator should combat those objections only, which the hearer actually makes, or, at least, may easily make. The positive reasons, on the other hand, for the practice of the Virtue then divide off into main masses by themselves which form the Parts of the oration.

In like manner, also, the Idea of Actuality, referred to one of the higher Ideas, may be the predominant Idea in an oration, as is most commonly the case before a court of justice. Here, the different proofs that a thing has or has not happened, fall into several classes, and these are the Parts of the oration. The old Rhetoricians, however, give us information on this, with a minuteness of detail which leaves nothing to be desired. In the sacred oration, also, Actuality may be the sole predominant Idea—first, when the orator wishes to prove a disputed fact belonging to sacred history; and, secondly, when he would sketch a picture of an important personage or fact, that shall be fruitful in practical application. In the first instance, he will maintain such a particular fact, not against skepticism in general, but against the doubts of his contemporaries only; he will not therefore take into view the objections of former times, but those only that are peculiar to their time; he will make a selection accordingly, from the mass of proofs which are at his command, and these are easily divided, according to their intrinsic character, into certain classes and divisions. In

the second instance, the orator brings into notice those qualities and characteristics of a person or a thing which are most congruous with the practical Idea which guides the whole oration. Thus, Actuality is the single predominant Idea in the sermon of Reinhard upon "The characteristics of the Church of Christ as seen in its origin;" and he describes this origin as pure in its sources, miraculous in its circumstances, noble in its aim, beneficent in its consequences.

A peculiarity, not so much in the manner of the division itself, as in the way of announcing it, is found in the French orators, especially in Massillon. When, namely, it is their principal business to combat the erroneous notions of their hearers—and any one of the above-mentioned predominant Ideas may lead to this, although the three higher less often than the three subordinate ; in such cases, I say, they are wont to announce, not those correct views which they wish to unfold, but the erroneous ones which they wish to combat. It is apparent that it amounts to the same thing in the end ; for the employment of this mode presupposes that the orator has divided the errors and their contrary truths into equal and correlative masses, and hence it makes no difference which of the two he announces specifically. There is always, however, something hazardous in this mode of proceeding, since it is easier to bring truths of which the speaker is himself thoroughly convinced, into a sure and certain connection, than the errors and doubts current among the multitude ; and if the orator has not so arranged these as that the threads of a full developement of the truth can be wound upon them, he will not combat them with success. The want of connection, and the breaks, so

frequently to be noticed in Massillon's sermons, are perhaps to be attributed to this manner of arranging the parts of an oration, which became an almost uniform habit with him; hence only the practised and skilful orator—and he only rarely—should make use of this manner. It is always safest for the orator to present in the very outset his own conviction, having some reference however to prevalent errors, and to combat these only when they come up of themselves in the development of his own thoughts.

But the complex oration, in which several Ideas are placed beside each other in equal importance, is of more frequent occurrence than the simple oration, of the division of which we have been speaking. It is apparent, at the first glance, that this species of oration conducts, with much more force and certainty, to the end in view, than the other. For, if the orator brings his leading Idea into connection with those of the hearer, only on one side, it is very possible for him to fail in the attempt to show its identity with them. In order to win over the hearer completely, the orator must lead him continually to one and the same goal from several points; the orator's Idea, if I may be allowed the expression, must continue to wind around the Idea of the hearer until it has become completely incorporated with it.

It is evident, now, that the complex oration has as many parts as there are predominant Ideas in it; and each one of these parts, again, may be regarded as a simple oration, and be divided according to the same rules, so that that which forms a main division in the simple oration, becomes a subdivision in

the complex. A common method, here, is to begin with the Category of Truth or Actuality, in order to throw due light over the subject of which the orator would treat, and then, in order to waken a higher interest, to follow up with the Idea of Virtue, Happiness, or Duty. This is the almost too uniform mode of division, when the orator speaks, first, of the nature, and, secondly, of the effects. But unless the Categories Truth and Actuality are handled by a very skilful master, discourse based upon them often becomes somewhat cold and tedious, and the hearer remains indifferent towards a subject of which the orator indeed gives right conceptions, but the relation of which to the higher demands of his moral nature, he does not make plain to him. Or else the orator, conscious himself of this coldness and dryness, allows himself to be led into the error of interweaving into this part of his oration those higher means of moving his hearers which should not be employed until later ; and in this way he oversteps the limits which he has prescribed for himself, and anticipates the contents of the divisions which are to follow, which he is now unable to fill out. Instead, therefore, of placing Truth and Actuality in an equal rank with the higher ethical Ideas, it may often be more suitable to subordinate them to these ; to make Happiness, Duty, or Virtue principal parts, and to insert the representation of Truth and Actuality only when the need of it becomes plainly apparent in the course of the development of those higher Ideas. But, again, there are some subjects in which the Idea of Truth or Actuality has such a decided preponderance, that the orator must make it predominant throughout his oration, and must interweave what he has

to say respecting Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, in the individual developements of the True or the Actual.

In this way, the six Rhetorical Ideas are associated with each other in an order and interchange the most manifold. The counter-action which the orator expects from the hearer, determines him to begin, now with this and now with that Idea, and to follow up with the others, thus or so ; and hence no universal rule can be laid down regarding a Plan of this sort, "since existing circumstances and relations have so great influence upon it : the Plan is, in fact, a resolution which the moral powers form, and which is shaped by the peculiar occasions and inducements which lead to it.

The course and movement of Ideas in a great orator can animate to a similarly pregnant and powerful movement in no other way than as the example of the hero animates to Virtue. Demosthenes, *e. g.*, in the first oration against Philip, begins with the Idea of Possibility ; he shows how a more fortunate issue may be expected in the case of further expeditions ; and as he proceeds, the doubts of his hearers vanish, their breasts swell, and fill with heart and hope. But the orator does not stop with considerations of a general nature ; he goes into detail, and lays before the people a circumstantial plan of all that is to be done. In this way he satisfies the understandings of his hearers, elevates their minds, and renders them open to the higher Ideas of State-weal, of Civic Merit, by which they are now carried captive at the will of the orator. But there is no course and movement of Ideas of such irresistible power as the one in the oration for Ctesiphon, in which, in accordance with the Idea of Possibility, it is first shown that the speaker could

not by any possibility have foreseen the issue of the battle at Chæronea, and then the Idea of Virtue follows with a startling rapidity—the orator affirming that, even if he had foreseen all, he should nevertheless have given no different counsel. The well-known division of Cicero's oration for Milo, according to the Ideas of Actuality and Legality, has some resemblance to the wonderful method of this oration of Demosthenes.

In the oration of Demosthenes upon the affairs of the Chersonesus, the Idea of Public Advantage is not connected, but entangled with that of Civil Law, in a highly singular manner. For, while according to the former he shows that the army which Diopeithes commanded in that country, should not be disbanded, he, at the same time, according to the latter, exculpates their general with respect to the acts of violence with which he was charged: a procedure to which he was probably compelled by the circumstances of the case, and which he carries through with extraordinary self-confidence, but which I would recommend no one to imitate, since, of Ideas thus entangled, the one commonly would be prejudicial to the other.

CHAPTER XIV.

FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR.

It has been remarked, respecting the Science of Morals, that there are three points from which it may be contemplated, and that a complete Philosophic presentation of it is rendered possible only by connecting these different views. Morals, in the first place, may be regarded as the enumeration of all those commandments derived from the one highest law, by which the will ought to be directed, and of the duties imposed by them. Secondly, the question may arise with respect to that character in the Subject, or agent, which is inclined and able to fulfil all these duties; and developed in this direction, the Science of Morals becomes a presentation of Ideal Virtue, or of Ideal Virtues. In the third place, again, the Product may be contemplated, which perfect Virtue produces by the fulfilment of all its duties, and this becomes the chief object in view, under the names of Prosperity, Happiness, the Highest Good. But, instead of connecting in one, these three different views, writers upon Morals commonly make but one of them prominent in their theories, which, consequently, must be one-sided and unsatisfactory. For does not the sum-total of all the different and scattered Virtues pre-suppose an acting Subject, in which they can concentrate and come into actual practice; and when this Subject is seen

acting, what is more natural than the inquiry after the Product of its activity?

We make these well-known statements, in the first place, in order, by placing the three different forms of the system of Morals beside the three highest Rhetorical Ideas mentioned by us, to justify our having assumed these latter as fundamental Ideas; and in the second place, still more, for the reason that these fundamental Ideas furnish rules for the treatment of Rhetoric as a system. If Rhetoric, as we affirm, is only a more general unfolding of Morals, the selection of one particular point of view, alone, would be a fault in Rhetoric, as well as in Morals, and the combination of all the points of view becomes as necessary in the former as it is in the latter. We have thus far developed the part of Morals which is called Rhetoric, from the Idea of Duty, as a point of view. For we began with laying down a law, of which we have pointed out the application, and from which we have derived several individual rules; and we have believed it necessary to take this method, for the sake of greater intelligibleness. Cicero and Quintilian—to compare those Philosophers who have developed Morals from the Idea of Virtue, as a point of departure—it seems to us, have in view particularly the representation of the Perfect Orator, whom Quintilian describes even from the time of his first instruction in school. But their representations are somewhat ambiguous, since, although in this way of treating the subject, we are, indeed, made sufficiently acquainted with the character and qualities of the orator, we can yet form no definite conception of his activity, because the rule by which it is to be judged of, remains unknown.

If now, as we have said above, we have sought to avoid this fault by laying down firm fundamental principles, we must also guard against falling into the opposite error of forgetting the character and qualities of the orator. The representation of these is the more important, since it might seem as if the mere knowledge and skilful application of the rules laid down by us were sufficient for the orator, and as if his moral character and qualities were to receive no farther notice ; which, if it were actually the case, would frustrate our endeavor to construct Rhetoric as a part of Morals. But such is not the case, and furthermore, it is impossible to follow all these rules, unless there be moral strength of Character, unless there be Virtue, and, in the case of the sacred orator, unless there be the inner life of Faith.

For the distinctive agency of the orator consists in giving a powerful impulse and direction to the minds of others, and he is not equal to this unless the goal to which he would direct them is plainly in his eye, and unless he earnestly desires to reach it himself. In a word, he must possess, so to speak, the Faculty of Moral Ideas, and these belong to Character. The Imagination, it is true, generates those Ideas from which the creations in the sphere of Art proceed ; although, even in the case of Art, as it seems to me, the products are always somewhat lacking in body and firmness, unless they are set up by Character. But, inasmuch, as the Will is the object which Eloquence seeks to influence, Eloquence must originate in the Will, in the moral state of the orator. Take the sacred orator for instance : where will he find matter for his discourses, if his own sanctification, if the moral and religious condition of men,

does not lie near his heart—if he does not earnestly desire to improve human character? In him alone who is animated by these motives—who labors upon himself, and contemplates men around him with the design of elevating them to a higher degree of perfection—only in such an one will Ideas that may be referred and applied easily to the highest aim and end of the human Will, be generated in their constant and abounding fulness; and such Ideas are, beyond question, motive-powers, moral and Christian in their nature. Nay, they presuppose a higher grade of morality—one that is raised far above that which is commonly called Virtue, the mere abstaining namely from Vice, and an irreproachable life. For if it is morally beautiful to will, at all times, that which is Best and Worthiest, for its own sake, it is still more beautiful by far, to desire at the same time, in connection with this, that which is Best and Worthiest for all mankind. This desire may be wanting in a man, and he not be morally bad in his life; but a far higher degree of moral perfection must be ascribed to him of whom it is the sole and actuating principle. Hence it is certainly no envious complaint, when a sacred oration is charged with being wanting in such moral Ideas as alone can beget a disposition of soul that is constantly employed in promoting the well-being of humanity. To give expression to one's self merely, to depict certain favorite views with self-complacency, cannot be represented as a vice exactly; but it is certainly proof of an imperfect nature, which is not able to forget itself, and to live only in the well-being of others; it indicates a want of that higher Character by which the orator produces the stuff and material employed

by him, and which, since the creative power in man is designated generally by the term Genius, we would style Moral Genius. In vain, therefore, is the command, "Refer your Ideas to the highest human Ideas," addressed to him who, absorbed in his own emotions, fancies and notions, does not feel the heroic impulse to seize upon the hearts of men, and to mould them into a nobler state; for he is lacking in the first and most necessary things—in Ideas,—and instead of these, he will play with figures, dissolve in soft emotion, or bring forward information, which is quite entertaining, it may be, but which produces, no effect upon the Will.

That which is true of the sacred orator, is true also of the civil orator. If he does not cling with disinterested love to his father-land, and is not impelled by this love to study closely the internal relations of his country, and to mark attentively the changes in its foreign relations, how is he, in important and difficult emergencies, to acquire correct views and to form salutary plans, without delay? He will be dumb, as was the case with the Athenian orators on hearing that Philip had taken Elatæa. "For," as Demosthenes said, "that day and that occasion demanded a man who had traced events from the beginning, and had formed a correct conclusion for what reason and for what end Philip had done that." And how had Demosthenes, the only one who spoke on this day, obtained this keener insight, except through his love of country, in which respect he was in advance of all his fellow-citizens? It may indeed be said, that in the absence of love of country, self-interest, hatred and friendship, preconceived opinions, political systems,

will not leave the orator destitute of Ideas and Plans. Perhaps not; but here the great difficulty presents itself, that these very designs are to be subjected to the highest ends of the State, and not of the individual Will, and this must be uncommonly difficult to accomplish, if they did not spring up in dependence upon and subjection to, the Common Weal, but were suggested by other and less noble motives. In order that his selfish Plans may succeed, the orator, as has been remarked, must bring them into connection with the highest moral Ideas; and if this connection is not a natural, but a forced one, talent of the first order will often fail in the endeavor to carry through the deception,* and the web of its argument will be torn into shreds by another orator, who perhaps speaks with less power, but whose Ideas have grown up out of the ground and soil of Patriotism. A fine instance of this is afforded in the two orations, which, according to Sallust, were delivered by Cæsar and Cato in the Roman Senate, respecting the punishment of the fellow-conspirators of Cataline. What can be finer than the arrangement of Cæsar's oration; how cunningly does he understand how to render the Ideas of magnanimity, positive law, and public advantage, available in a case in which it was his sole aim to support the mere instruments of his own ambitious plans! With less art, but with greater power, the honest Cato forces his way through, and the whole Senate sides with him. And thus, finally, by our own examination and by the example of

* A wrong design is betrayed by the contradictions in the course and connection of thought.

'Επειδέν τις, οἵματι, κακουργῶν ἐπὶ μὴ προσῆκοντα πράγματα τοῦς λόγους μεταφέρει, διωγμαρεῖς αὐτούκη φύεσσοθει.—*Demosth. aduersus Leptinum*, p. 100, ed. Welf.

the younger Cato, that definition of the orator is justified, which, according to Quintilian,* originated with the elder Cato, and which is indisputably the best that has come down to us from antiquity, viz: *The orator is an upright man who understands speaking.*



BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

AFFECTION AND PASSION.

BEFORE we proceed further, let us cast a glance over the path which we have opened.

It was our design to seek for a highest fundamental principle, that should bring unity and connection into the fragmentary and disconnected Theory of Eloquence. In order to this, we made one of the characteristics of Eloquence—the striving to produce an influence outwardly—its essential characteristic, and in this way found that it stands upon an ethical basis and ground, and is an active process; that, as it proceeds only from Ideas, it can address itself only to Ideas. The developement of this single thought has already led us to important results, and has combined into a systematic unity, many assertions which in the common Theories of Eloquence are laid down without proof; and we have also been enabled by it to correct many errors in the prevailing views on this subject. We have seen that there is but one Eloquence, and that civil Eloquence is connected with sacred by the unity of its constituent principle, although each is differently modified by the particular relation in which it moves;

that the Ancients, in conformity with a feeling in the highest degree correct, have assumed three species of Eloquence, corresponding to the three highest Ideas; by laying down Truth as a subordinate Rhetorical Idea, we have found again one of the characteristics of Eloquence—its inclination to Philosophy, but, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, have thrown some light upon the difficult question respecting the dividing line between Philosophy and Eloquence; we have given rules respecting the plan and division of an oration which proceed according to Ideas, and, therefore, are preferable to the common method of division, which proceeds merely according to Conceptions; and, finally, in order to justify our ethical view, we have in different places made it apparent that the orator is capacitated for the performance of his proper business only by means of a truly moral state of heart.

And thus, as we believe, has our ethical principle maintained itself, so far as that part of Rhetoric is concerned which embraces the doctrine of invention and arrangement; for all the rules which can properly be given respecting these subjects flow directly from the fundamental law laid down by us, which, in its developement, has shown not only how each and everything in this part of Eloquence should be, but also why it should be so, and not otherwise. To maintain this principle with respect to that part of Rhetoric which is now to follow—with respect to Elocution, so called—seems a work of greater difficulty. For since the excitement of the Affections, or at least of the Passions, is that with which we have to do here, how, it may be asked, is this to take its origin from an

ethical principle—nay, even to be justified before it? Furthermore, we are here, and rightly too, to expect the outlines at least, of a Theory of Prose; and it would seem that an ethical principle could in no way lead to it. It does indeed seem so; but it is seeming merely; for, in fact, this part of Rhetoric constitutes the very triumph of the ethical view, since problems are solved by it which can be solved by no other view.

But we must, in the first place, express our regret at the errors by which this part of the subject has been disfigured, and for which the Ancients, properly, are responsible, who, since they are now universally lauded, must here, at least, take home a merited blame. This blame falls, first, upon the Rhetoricians, who again can throw the accusation back upon the orators themselves, or, rather, upon the circumstances amidst which they spoke. Ancient Eloquence owed its power and definiteness principally to the rapidity with which the effect followed immediately after the oration was ended; but in this very circumstance lay also a source of degeneration. For, since the orator contended for honor, property and life, and since the possession or loss of these depended upon the effect of the oration, he would, in this his strait, find every means good, of whatever sort, provided it only led to the end in view; and he who could get hold of no noble means, must often content himself with bad ones, satisfied if he only attained his end, and not considering that he would have attained it with much more certainty had he employed worthier means. Hence the orators allowed themselves in artifices of many sorts, in order to deceive the judges and the people—

to dazzle them and excite their passions. This Practice, which, of necessity, must often succeed, passed over into the Theory of Eloquence, which, in this instance, as generally, was not able to rise above the existing Practice. The artifices for stimulating the minds of the hearers were collected together and arranged in a connected series; and Rhetoricians, who held the excitement of the passions to be necessary in their art, taught for this end, not the training of the mind, to use Plato's phrase,* but the actual deceiving of the mind. Aristotle does this in the section of his Rhetoric where he treats of the Passions; and Cicero speaks of the means which he employs for exciting them with a frankness at which we cannot but be surprised.†

But it is, perhaps, equally surprising that these writers, and those who have harmonized with them in sentiment, should have been implicitly believed, and that these artifices should have been held necessary and indispensable in secular Eloquence at least. The example of Demosthenes alone, it seems to me, could not but have led to the thought that they might be dispensed with, and that other means might be employed in their stead, which are not only much nobler, but also much more reliable. If this orator had written a Rhetoric, it would certainly have been different from Cicero's Rhetorical writings, and have been not unworthy of his instructor Plato, who, in the *Gorgias*, lays down such a strict view

* *Ψεχαγωγία*.—*Phædrus*, p. 331, ed. Heindorf.

† Qua (miseratione) nos ita dolenter usi sumus, ut puerum infantem in manibus perorantes tenuerimus; ut alia in causa, excitato reo nobili, sublato etiam filio parvo, plangore et lamentatione complerimus forum.

Orator, c. 38.

of Eloquence. But the Eloquence of Demosthenes, like his character, possesses an elevation, which, of necessity, must fail of being apprehended; and owing to their inability to rightly estimate the Rhetorical means which he employs, the Ancients, and we after them, have believed to have detected the very same artifices in him, which are plainly apparent in other orators.

In order to prepare the way for this part of Rhetoric, it is necessary to enter upon a psychological investigation, and to establish a distinction between two things, which, though very different from each other, are yet commonly confounded with each other—namely, between Affection and Passion. The movements in our minds differ very much in their nature, their duration, and their importance, according as they are produced by external objects, or are generated from within outwards. An external object, or the representation of it, excites, if we desire or loathe it, a movement within us which is rightly called Passion, since we are passive in the matter, and yield ourselves up to an influence which operates upon us from without. This condition of the soul cannot, in strictness, be justified, since it supposes the inactivity of the Reason, a power which, indeed, cannot always prevent the reception of impressions from without, but which should, nevertheless, limit, elevate, and, if they are injurious, suppress them. Moreover, this inward condition is, in its nature, unquiet, perplexed, and painful to the mind, which is always troubled by the feeling of dependence upon external objects, and in its duration it is transient, since it is produced by a transitory object. Entirely different from this, is that excitement of the

mind which owes its origin to an Idea; I call it Affection, (Affekt,) and not Passion, since the spirit in this case affects itself through its own activity, instead of passively receiving an impression from without, as in the other case. Yet this term Affection, which renders me liable to misapprehension, and is not, by any means, adequate, I employ only because I know of no better one. What, however, I mean by it, will be clear from what follows. A mind in which an Idea has become living consciousness, cannot possibly retain that coldness which accompanies mere abstract representations or conceptions; for since the Idea contains within itself the notion of an activity of some sort, and the impulse to it, it must necessarily appropriate to itself all the powers of the soul, and set them in motion in one definite direction; and from this united working of all the faculties—from the exertion accompanying it, an inward state must arise, distinguished by a higher degree of warmth and life. In case a creation in the domain of Art results from the Idea, this inward state is denominated Poetic or Artistic inspiration, and is universally recognized and esteemed as Good and Beautiful in its nature. But the same warmth and glow attends upon all ethical Ideas which strive to break forth into activity; nothing but the mere refraining from Evil can have coldness of soul as its attendant; he who strives to produce something Great and Good, will never be without ardor, without affection. Yet we should never apply the name Passion to this fine mental manifestation; this term indicates the inactivity of the higher spiritual powers, while, on the contrary, Affection, as distinguished from Passion, supposes the highest activity of the

Reason, which is the parent of Ideas. Furthermore, the warmth of Feeling and of Passion is obscure and vague—to use a comparison, is like a dimly burning fire; Affection, on the contrary, constantly conscious, constantly attentive to the slightest hint of Reason, capable of checking itself in the midst of the most rapid course, is to be compared to the sun-light, which brings even more clearness than warmth with it. For this reason, and also because Affection does not, like Passion, divide the mind into two contending parties, but unites all the powers of the soul, and all the emotions of the heart, in finest harmony with the Reason, it is the happiest state by far to which man can raise himself. That it is also a perfectly moral state, it seems unnecessary to add. It is, especially when generated by ethical Ideas, man's moral nature itself, and that, too, in its finest splendor, its highest dignity, and elevated far above that coldness of soul which is sometimes denominated rational, although with great injustice, since a powerful activity of the Reason must necessarily banish all coldness. Finally, Affection is distinguished from Passion, by the fact that the former is as permanent as the latter is transient. For since the Idea which generates it can never be exhausted by a single exhibition, but only by a continued series of exhibitions, and, therefore, has a long-continued existence—nay, if it is a moral Idea, an eternal existence, for the contemplating mind, it imparts this attribute and duration to the mental affection which accompanies it.

Instead, however, of duly distinguishing between two mental manifestations so diverse as those above described, it is too common to denominate everything as Passionate, that is at-

tended with any degree of fire and life ; and it often happens that that which is Beautiful and Excellent in the highest degree, is degraded by the debasing conception which is connected with this word. We should, therefore, never ascribe to one who is given up to an Art, or a Science, as soon as he is capable of producing something within its sphere, by his own independent power, a Passion for this Art or Science ; his love is an Affection which is generated by Ideas ; and he, alone, has a Passion for an Art who merely desires to contemplate its creations for the sake of the pleasure they produce, without being excited to any activity of spirit by them. In the social relations of men also, not all Love is Passion. Love is Passion only when it strives after the possession of the loved object, as after the possession of a piece of property which it wishes to obtain and hold ; it is something far higher, it is Affection, so soon as the Idea of a *perpetual* connection comes to lie at the bottom of it ; an Idea which is neither disturbed by separating circumstances, nor grows cold from the earthly possession of the object. Speaking generally, the action of man should never be Passionate, but always Affectionate ; it should never betray the fire which an external object has kindled, but should be constantly animated by that mild and clear warmth which accompanies all that springs from the inward depths of the spirit. And thus let us, in Eloquence also, distinguish the discourse of a man who is filled with an Idea, which he would impart to others in an equal degree of clearness and warmth, from the effort, ever to be condemned, to awaken their Passions.

CHAPTER II.

THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION, AND
TO AWAKEN AFFECTION.

HAVING, in the foregoing, shown that true Affection as distinguished from Passion, is never morally wrong, but is always to be regarded as intrinsically Beautiful and Excellent, we now go still farther, and affirm, that it is absolutely necessary that the orator speak with Affection. For he goes before an assembly only in order to impart to it the Idea by which he is himself pervaded; and this Idea, if it actually be an Idea, must be accompanied with Affection. If we find the orator wanting in this, we are justified in assuming that he is not animated by an Idea; that he seems to purpose and undertake something, but in reality has no definite purpose, and, therefore, is in contradiction with himself; that he pursues his business from necessity merely, like a day-laborer, or from by-ends like a demagogue, or from cold and chilling vanity, like a mere fine speaker; and any one of these assumptions, if just and warranted, will prevent the hearer from respecting the man, or opening his heart to him. What we have said, moreover, respecting the difference between Affection and Passion, will, it is hoped, protect us from the charge of demanding in the orator, feverish heat, sickly emotion, or strained animation; we demand warmth with thoughtfulness, feeling with reason, emphasis without distortion, light and fire without vapor; fine qualities, which

even the common hearer knows how to estimate, and readily distinguishes from the Extravagant and Artificial.

Every one who has ever come before the people, filled with a great Idea, has spoken with Affection ; but with the greatest Affection by far, He who gave utterance to the greatest Ideas ; namely, Christ. This Light of the World reveals eternal Truth with an abiding Inspiration, which is at one time mild and gentle, at another, with thunder and crash ; a great example for every sacred orator, and one that warrants him in dispensing with all, so called, philosophical calmness, and obligates him to speak with similar Affection.

Supposing, now, that there are means whereby Affection can be imparted to others, it is plain that the use of these means can never be injurious, but always and only beneficial. For they never rouse up mere blind feeling to a life and energy that renders Reason inactive ; on the contrary, mere blind feeling is held in subordination, since the orator compels it to co-operate towards his ends, and, in this way, there arises inward harmony, which is man's most perfect condition. The fear, also, that the orator may go too far in exciting Affection, seems to me to be entirely unfounded, for Affection is generated by a stronger activity of the Reason, in which there can be no excess, and the calm Thought must at every moment lead back within its proper limits the discursive Feeling. Passion most certainly may become too strong, or rather, it should never become so, but how the Ideas of the moral Reason can be accompanied with too lively Affection, or how it is possible for these same Ideas, sanctified by Religion, to seize upon the mind with too great power, I, at least, cannot

imagine. The orator, therefore, if he is able to excite Affection, need prescribe no limits to himself while making the attempt; owing to human weakness, instead of going too far, he will ordinarily have to blame himself for having done too little. And if it is objected that Affection, like every lively frame of the soul, is transitory, I ask whether it is for this reason merely, to be deemed worthless, and whether every single hour which is spent in the feeling of enthusiasm for the Highest and Best is not a positive gain and a beautiful reward for the soul that is the subject of it? But this objection is without foundation; for Affection owes its existence to the heightened activity of Reason alone; and Reason, by means of the fuller developement it has received in the process, is always of itself independently able to reproduce Affection.

Invariably excluding everything Passionate, and assuming that Affection can be imparted to the hearer, we can now, without any opposition whatever, we hope, lay down the assertion, that it is the duty of the orator to awaken Affection. In case, either from principle or from inability, he disclaims this obligation, his activity must be limited to that of which we have treated in the First Book; namely, to proving that the particular Idea of his oration is contained in the general Idea of the hearer, and that the hearer, if he wills Duty, or Virtue, or Happiness, must also will this or that procedure to which these Ideas lead. But what is accomplished by this? As good as nothing. This might indeed do, if in man, Knowing, Willing, and Doing, were one and the same act. In this case, he would only need to know that he ought to will, in order to will, and would only need to will, in order to do. But

such is not the case. There is a cold abstract Knowing which generates no Willing ; there is a feeble Willing which never passes over into Doing. But to what does this cold Knowing and this feeble Willing lead, and how can the orator be satisfied with producing it ? For the very reason, that something is to be accomplished which is not yet accomplished ; for the very reason, that he finds the State and the Church in a corrupt, or at least an imperfect condition, and would have it changed for the better ; for this, and no other reason, does he come forward as an orator ; this is the end towards which he must labor, if he would not be in contradiction with himself ; and if he does not attain it, he has spoken in vain. But in order to attain it, it is necessary, that the Idea of the hearer be raised to such a grade of vitality as that it can immediately pass over into act ; for that blazing up of all the inward powers which we denominate Affection, indicates the moment when the Idea is breaking through and coming forth into Actuality. If the capacity of being conscious of Ethical Ideas must be predicated of every man, and yet very few act in accordance with Ideas, this is only because Affection is wanting in them, the very link itself, which, in the chain of human activity, connects Willing with Doing. The sentiment which the orator labors to produce in his hearers, and the resolution which he seeks to have them take, are to be brought about immediately, not only when he speaks before the judge or before his fellow-citizens, but also when he speaks before a Christian assembly. For if it is not brought about immediately, when will it be ? At another time ? But why defer that which is in itself good ? Or would the orator merely enlight-

en and cultivate the Reason, under the conviction that well-regulated action will then be developed of itself, from it? But experience proves the contrary; it shows us men of very cultivated Reason, who either do not act at all, or act wrongly. And, moreover, how is this gradual cultivation possible in the case of the orator, to whom, at this one particular moment, a mind is surrendering itself, which perhaps will never again fall within the sphere of his influence? Is nothing at all to be done for such an one, and how long is the orator to wait for something to be developed of itself, from the audience before him? Their ethical Ideas they bring with them; they are therefore, at this moment, just as susceptible to every good influence, as they will be years hence; for it is the individual who changes—the mass, on the whole, is ever the same. The objection in question proceeds from the false supposition, that it is necessary for the orator to laboriously impart to men that intelligence which lies at the bottom of action; but he is spared this labor, since every man by nature possesses the ethical Ideas. Perhaps there is sometimes in the orator, as in the hearer, an aversion towards the exhibition of Affection, which conceals itself behind these objections, but which, after what has been said, can hardly pass as praiseworthy.

If now it be asked, in what does the business of the orator properly consist—in conviction or persuasion—I confess that I can declare decidedly neither for the one nor for the other, and that it seems to me the question ought not to be asked, since it is based upon a false view of Eloquence. So far as conviction is concerned, this is by no means sufficient to constitute the substance of Eloquence, if by it is under-

stood the proof that the particular Idea of the orator is contained in the general Idea of the hearer. But this is hardly the meaning given to the word; it is generally taken to denote a demonstration, by means of which the whole Philosophic connection of the thoughts of the orator is impressed upon the hearer, in order that he may be excited to one particular act. Conviction of this sort seems to me to be an impossibility, and I believe that the best Dialectician has not yet succeeded in entirely bringing over his opponent to his own standing point. But even if it were a possibility, I should deem it useless for the orator to start from the highest principles of all knowledge and action, when he might directly, and with entire certainty of success, fasten on upon the ethical Ideas. It were also sad, in the highest degree, to be compelled to go through with a course in Philosophy with a man in order to move him to the performance of a good action. But this part of the subject, as I believe, has been sufficiently explained in the First Book. I can as little approve of persuasion, if by it is understood the distortion or darkening of representations, in order to excite the Passions; no able orator will betake himself to this means, and we have shown that he has no need to do so. If, however, conviction may be taken to denote the production of the Idea in consciousness, and persuasion its elevation and transformation into Affection—which, however, as I believe, the common use of language does not permit—I would answer the question above by saying, that the business of the orator consists neither in conviction nor persuasion alone; but that his conviction should be *persuasive*, and his persuasion *convincing*.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION.

BEFORE we proceed to treat of the means of exciting the Affections, we must first become acquainted with the different kinds of Affections. Affection is not always one and the same; for, in the first place, the Ideas upon which it attends, although all of them of an ethical nature, may be very different from each other. In the second place, the character and qualities, as well of the Subject in whom the Idea is generated as of the Object to which it is referred, vary. For example, the Idea of Duty may be generated in a guilty or in an innocent mind—may be applied to a guilty or an innocent man; and in relations so dissimilar, the Affection arising from the enlivenment of this Idea must assume different hues. Finally, in the third place, several Affections, in themselves different, may flow together, and, by their union, form a third. The knowledge of these different kinds of Affections seems to us to be necessary, since, without it, it will be impossible to determine whether the means of exciting the Affections which we shall present, are sufficient or not. This knowledge will also enable us the better to distinguish the Affections from the Passions—a distinction upon which I lay the greatest stress, since only through its observance can Eloquence be restored again to its proper rank. Indeed, it does not escape me, that I am here entering upon the dangerous ground of Psychology,

so called, from which perhaps the fragments of so many unsuccessful undertakings in this department of Rhetoric ought to deter me ; yet the safe clue with which I venture into this domain, will perhaps preserve me from a similar failure. It is true, that nothing can be done in Psychology, if that observation of self and of others, from which it draws its truths, is pursued at hap-hazard, and without leading principles. But here we have something firm, universal, and sure, in the ethical Ideas, which we bring down into the lower region (so to speak) of the mind, only in order to observe what will result from their contact with the natural feelings and the different inward states of men. In this, or in a similar way, it may perhaps not be impossible to distinguish and to designate satisfactorily all the different movements in the mind which so interpenetrate and run through each other, and which no so-called empirical Psychology has as yet systematized. Yet, what we shall be able to do here, can be regarded as only a slight contribution towards such an undertaking.

With ~~the~~ regard now to the Idea of Duty, it is apparent that the inward state of a man who is warmed and enlivened by it, and who strives with all his powers to realize it in conduct, must be remarked as a peculiar Affection. It is denominated *Zeal*, and it is naturally the strongest in him who regards the law which he obeys from love, as a truly divine law ; it is weaker in degree, yet not essentially different, in the mind of him who receives the law by which he regulates his conduct, from the State solely, or who believes that he imposes it upon himself. If, however, man does not strive after

the realization of an Idea, but after the possession of an outward good, his *Zeal*, which at first was an Affection, degenerates into Passion. If the Idea of Duty has been suppressed for a long time in a man's mind, and again acquires dominion within it, it begets, with reference to his past faulty state, *Shame* and *Repentance*, the liveliness of which, like that of *Zeal*, is in proportion to the seriousness of the sphere in which the Duty is conceived to be obligatory, and which, like the Affection of *Zeal*, would cease to be pure Affections, if the individual, instead of charging himself with the positive neglect of duty, should charge upon himself merely the neglect to make use of a favorable opportunity to promote some earthly advantage. The perception, in the case of another, of the difference between what he actually does and what he ought to do, excites in different degrees the Affection of *Anger*, which, in order to remain a pure Affection, must never go farther than to the bad action itself, and which becomes a Passion so soon as it is directed against the person of the agent.

The Idea of Virtue, whether its perfection in God, in Christ, or the approximation to its perfection in a good man, be considered, through the Affection accompanying it, becomes *Love*, *Friendship*, *Esteem*, *Beneficence*, *Emulation*, *Admiration*. These are pure expressions, from which the common use of language has already banished every notion of passionateness, with the exception only, that by *Love* is not always meant an Affection, generated by the Idea of Virtue, for an object in which this Idea is perfectly, or in part realized, but often, also, a passionate desire for that which stimu-

lates unnaturally. *Love*, as an Affection, has the Godhead for its highest object, with which it strives to unite and become one, and can pass over to a human being only in case the human being manifests something divine. Accordingly, it is more perfect in its nature than *Friendship*, since it reveringly recognizes the whole Individuality of the loved object, while *Friendship*, on the contrary, is generated by esteem for only certain particular, mainly moral, qualities. Yet, as *Love* strives after an abiding union with its object, so there is also in *Friendship* the desire for community of feeling and action ; if this fails, *Esteem* remains, which is denominated *Benevolence*, when it is accompanied with the impulse to manifest itself in procuring some earthly advantage for the object of its regard. *Emulation* is inseparable from *Love* and *Friendship*, and, in general, arises in a mind that is pervaded by the Idea of Virtue, on seeing its Ideal of Excellence more perfectly realized in another being than itself. *Admiration* is the loving recognition of another's Excellence, when it is unattainable by us, or, at least, when it seems so far removed from our own Ideal, that we cannot strive after it, without renouncing our own Ideal, and ourselves, as it were. Thus the Hero admires the Poet, and the Poet the Hero, while each follows after a restricted Ideal, and one that is and must be foreign to the other. But no one admires either the invisible Godhead, or the Godhead as revealed in Christ, for the very reason that its perfection is without limits or restrictions, and, consequently, may be taken as an Ideal by every man. The Idea of Virtue produces the Affection of *Contempt* and *Disesteem* towards those who seem to be destitute of the Idea of Virtue ;

though *Disesteem* more properly has reference to the absence of civic merit, or desert in relation to the State. *Contempt* is a very harsh, and, therefore, an imperfect Affection ; he alone feels it who stands upon a low point of view, and who believes himself to be the creator of the virtue he possesses. He who is convinced that he has received it from God, without any merit of his own, will be more inclined to *Pity* than *Contempt*, in relation to the sinner.

Finally, in the third place, the following Affections are associated with the Idea of Happiness :—*Longing* after the highest Good, *Hope* to obtain it, *Gratitude* towards him who has rendered aid in obtaining it, *Pity* for the erring who does not strive after it at all, or in a false way, *Fear* of all that might deprive us of it, and *Abhorrence* of evil within ourselves, as the worst enemy of our true happiness. Yet, in order to preserve these affections pure, the Idea of Happiness must be conceived in its greatest purity ; and it is for the very reason that this is seldom done, that the Affections at this point border so closely upon the Passions. He who stands upon the position of the mere moralist, and seeks his happiness in an unhindered activity, will detect in himself a displeasure, not altogether pure and unselfish, towards all who oppose him in any way. But these Affections most easily degenerate into Passions, when the Idea of Happiness is applied to political relations, and the individual animated by it is striving after the welfare of the State. So long as *Enthusiasm* only, is felt in relation to those who promote the welfare of the State, and *Displeasure* only, in relation to those who disturb it, these are beautiful Affections, and worthy of

esteem; but, instead of *Enthusiasm*, there very easily arises blind *Adoration*, and instead of *Displeasure*, raging *Hatred*; and these political Passions, which pre-suppose a great obscuration of the rational Idea of Happiness, are the more frightful, because it is easy for every man to justify to himself, and to others, his own selfish efforts, under the appearance of a patriotic disposition. In like manner, *Envy* against him who has done us some injury, is never an Affection, but always a Passion. The same is true of *Enviness*, in which the *Begrudging* another of his Happiness is connected with *Hatred* towards him for having it. Even *Pity* has something of Passion in it, if we deplore the case of an unhappy person, not for his own sake, but from a lurking, unconscious intimation, that possibly we may soon find ourselves in his condition. It is a true Affection only when, as has been said before, it springs from the pure Idea of Happiness dwelling in us, and in some degree realized in our own case, but which we miss in the striving of another, or when our feeling for the miserable is elevated and ennobled by the additional influence of the Ideas of Justice and of Virtue, as is the case on seeing an innocent man stricken with disease, or a man who, considering his high qualities, merited a better fate. As the sight of an innocent man, stricken with disease, calls forth an elevated *Pity* that is full of Affection, so the sight of prosperous Vice begets *Moral Indignation*,* which, like *Compassion*, is a mixed Affection, and springs from the connection of the Idea of Justice with the Idea of Happiness.

Aristotle, who, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, condemns

* Nemesis.

the excitement of the Passions, but who afterwards, unable to carry out his theory independently, adapts himself to the necessities of the case, treats of the subject-matter of this chapter with evident interest, and with the precision in the specification of particulars peculiar to him. He assumes eleven Passions:—*Anger, Placability, Love, Hatred, Fear, Shame, Benevolence, Moral Indignation, Pity, Envy, Emulation*. It is easy to see how, in this enumeration, things the most diverse are brought together—e. g., the mean vice of *Envy*, with the noble striving of *Emulation*, and, consequently, how necessary it is to distinguish between Affection and Passion. Let it also be noticed that this list of Aristotle is not more copious than our own, and, consequently, that we have not been compelled, in order to systematically arrange the actual phenomena of consciousness, to mutilate them in the least.

APPENDIX.

WIT.

If we, of right, require in the orator the ability to awaken Affection, we should also, perhaps, require that he have Wit. Wit is the destruction of Affection; it is the bent of a mind, which, instead of being carried away by the Holy and the Great, makes it an object of its scrutiny, and entertains itself with the apparent contradictions and contrasts which are contained in it. The play of such a mind is much more sure

and safe when it is directed against a Passion, which continually presents a great number of weak points, and which is always checked and abated whenever Wit gets the upper hand. It might, therefore, seem as if the weapon of Wit were necessary to the orator, not indeed for attack, but for defence against a Passion or an Affection awakened by his opponent, that is working against him. This is the only one, among the many shallow reasons mentioned by Cicero, for the employment of Wit in Eloquence, that is not utterly to be rejected.* And, indeed, it cannot be denied that a well-applied sally of wit is of great effect when the orator needs merely to free himself from some entanglement, to help himself quickly out of a momentary embarrassment, and by a brief word to get rid of a matter, especially if it does not pertain to the higher relations of human existence, and is of no special importance to any one. Yet, when the orator has in view the excitement of a great and powerfully moving Affection, Wit, however skilfully applied, can produce only an injurious effect. It may indeed deprive the reasoning of an opponent of its force, and extinguish the fire which he has kindled; but the hearer is thereby put into an indifferent mental state that is destitute of Affection, and one in which he is more inclined to reflection than to action. But the orator should never let it come to this, for while in this way he destroys the Affection or Passion which his opponent has called forth, he at the same time destroys that which has been produced by himself, and must, after an interruption so disturbing in its effects, be-

* Quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat.—*De Oratore*, II. 58.

gin his whole work over again. The intermingling of Wit in an oration, is therefore unworthy of a true orator, and it seems to me the orator is upon true and high ground only when, without utterly annihilating the particular Affection which has been called forth in opposition, he throws it back with redoubled force upon his opponent. In this way, without any cold and indifferent state intervening, Affection follows upon Affection, and that awakened last is strengthened by the contrast with the preceding. It will not be more difficult, it will rather be more easy for him who speaks with the consciousness of the goodness of his cause, and can apply the whole power of the moral Ideas to his own purposes, to suddenly reverse a false feeling in the mind of the hearer, which is unfavorable to himself, than first to kill all feeling in him, and then re-animate him for his own purposes.

In order to clearly perceive how foreign Wit is from Eloquence, let one consider the nature of sacred Eloquence, and ask himself, What would be the effect of a witty sally—against an opposer of religion, for example—in the midst of a serious discourse? Would it not, of necessity, so destroy the whole impression of the discourse as that it would be impossible to think even, of renewing it again? Of similar effect, also, is Wit in political Eloquence, although less hazardous, because the contrast with the main character of the discourse is not so sharp and striking. Upbuilding, to speak generally, is the proper function of the orator; he can therefore have to do with destroying, only in passing and briefly.

The tendency to Wit and the capability of employing it, were very slight, in the serious mind of Demosthenes, in which

great ~~affections~~ were constantly dominant, while they were prominent qualities in Cicero. The latter took great pleasure in practising this talent, which flattered his vanity, while in the orations of Demosthenes no traces of it are to be met with, although he was often the subject of the witty sallies of his contemporaries. Quintilian, who in general is more prejudiced in favor of his countryman than he should be, in reference to this quality places him above Demosthenes; a totally false judgment, since he praises him on account of a quality which rather merits condemnation. Cicero is very entertaining perhaps, to the modern reader, in those passages in which he covers his opponent with wit and ridicule, but let one only observe how Demosthenes refutes his adversary with earnest vehemence, with what masterly ability he converts defence into an attack, and hurls back as an accusation the annihilated charge of his opponent, and then ask himself which method is most conformed to the end of the orator, most elevated and noble, most virtuous ?

CHAPTER IV.

THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION; OR, THE RHETORICAL PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT.

THE way for the investigation of the important inquiry, by what means Affection can be excited, seems to have been sufficiently prepared, by what has been said in proof of the moral dignity and worth of this mental state, and of the duty of the orator to call it into existence. We do not treat of the excitement of the Passions, because it is a subject which can find a place only in a Rhetoric constructed according to entirely false, or, at least, imperfect principles. Aristotle, upon this subject, imparts an amount of instruction which, in completeness and fulness of rich and fine remark, can hardly be surpassed. Yet it all amounts simply to this, that each Passion has its particular object by which it can be excited, if it be depicted in lively colors, and placed vividly before the view. A little imagination and so-called knowledge of human nature, accompanied with a versatile character, or an evil will, is often sufficient in order to succeed in this. It is not even necessary that the orator himself feel the Passion which he would enkindle; nay, this might rather be a hindrance to him, since it would destroy his coolness and self-possession. We acknowledge, moreover, that in many circumstances, and having to do with certain characters, it may be much easier to allow a Passion to blaze forth, than to produce an Affection;

nay, that the former, in comparison with the latter, is mere child's-play. But besides that such a procedure is not moral in its nature, it is also a highly uncertain and deceptive means in order to attain a Rhetorical end, as we have already shown; so that Good Sense, which goes hand-in-hand with Duty, limits the activity of the orator to the production of Ideas, and their enlivenment into Affections.

While now a Passion may be made to blaze forth, by one who is destitute of Passion himself, he alone, on the other hand, is able to awaken an Affection, who is himself enlivened and pervaded by it. For the aim, in this case, is not to render the mind of the hearer susceptible to the stimulus of an external object, in order to which, it is not indispensably necessary that the orator himself be strongly affected by it; but to transfer something that has been generated in the depths of the soul, into another person, which can be done only in proportion as the orator himself possesses that which is to be produced. Furthermore, it has been shown, that in the mind of the orator the Affection is most intimately connected with the Idea, and that it arises only as an effect of the Idea, and in proportion to the degree in which the Idea is unfolded and developed. In like manner, it can never be produced in the mind of the hearer by means which lie without the Idea, but only by means of the Idea itself, and its presentation. Only when the orator succeeds in imparting the Idea which is living, and creative in his own mind, to the hearer, in an equal degree of force and clearness, will the Idea break forth into activity in both speaker and hearer with equal power, *i. e.*, be accompanied with the same Affec-

tion in each. If, therefore, we can discover a particular and peculiar manner of presentation, by which an ethical Idea may be gradually carried up to its highest completeness in the mind of another, we shall have discovered the true means of awakening Affection. I say a particular and peculiar manner of presentation, for at this point especially, it must be evident, that it can be neither a Philosophical nor a Poetical manner. For although Philosophy exhibits Ideas in themselves, and Poetry, an Idea in a sensuous dress, yet neither strives to excite an Affection from which a sudden revolution, either in the inward state of a man, or in the outward condition of human society, may proceed ; and even if anything similar to this results from the Philosophical or Poetical manner of presenting Ideas, yet the design to attain it, forms no part of this manner of presentation, and exerts no influence upon it, when it is pure and perfect in its character and execution. But the Rhetorical manner of presenting Ideas has the excitement of Affection, for its peculiar aim and end ; and I affirm that this is the only point of view from which we can proceed, if we would consecutively and systematically derive its rules and laws. After having treated, in the First Book, of the Plan and Division, we shall therefore now endeavor to penetrate more deeply into the secret of Rhetorical Composition.

The success of our attempt to refer the Theory of Eloquence to ethical principles, would be very doubtful, if we should now find ourselves compelled to leave the path which we have hitherto trodden, and to deduce the laws of the Rhetorical presentation of thought, which have for their aim

the awakening of Affection, from some other domain than that of Ethics; perhaps from a newly-invented Theory of the Beautiful and Sublime, which we had connected as a little addendum with the main system, or perhaps from the Theory of the Emotions, and some shrewd empirical rules for exerting an influence upon the human mind. But we find ourselves in no such desperate position, but take up our investigation again, precisely at the point where we dropped it in order to explain some subjects which presented themselves, by the aid of the principles which had been established, and proceed in the deduction of the laws, according to which a free being may exert influence upon other free beings. The first was: the orator must subordinate his particular Idea to the universal and necessary Ideas of hearers; and upon this was based all that we have thus far developed. It is now incumbent upon us to lay down the remaining laws which are to be observed in this case, and to show how they, and they only, are the best, sole means of attaining the end which the orator must of necessity prescribe to himself, viz. the production of Affection.

He, therefore, who, as a free being, would work upon other free beings, and has already brought his particular Idea into harmony with their innate and necessary Ideas, must, in the first place, closely adapt his method of treating the subject to existing circumstances and relations. He must, in the second place, with all this reference to the position in which he finds himself, with all the resistance or avoidance of the obstacles which he meets in his path, at the same time be shut up and continue, in one constant, unceasing, progressive process.

But since, in the third place, through this advancing movement, the entire relation of the orator is every moment changing, and assuming another form and shape, every element of his activity must likewise be distinguished by a particular form and shape; and as his method, as a whole, was adapted to the relations which he found already existing, so each of the steps in it must be in harmony with these changes brought about by himself.

These three laws—the first of which we denominate the Law of Adaptation, the second the Law of Constant Progress, the third the Law of Vivacity—we shall now examine, and endeavor to apply to Eloquence, as the means of exciting Affection.

CHAPTER V.

THE LAW OF ADAPTATION.

It is not merely a maxim of good sense, it is an ethical law, that our influence upon others should be adapted to the circumstances under which it is attempted to be exercised. These circumstances are no other than our relations to our fellow-men, which again are determined by their particular Individuality, and by all that is connected with this. But every man demands that his Individuality be respected, and although he acknowledges that it can and must undergo modifications, he nevertheless demands that these consist not in the suppression, but in the cultivation and elevation of what is already existing within him. Since this is a demand which every man makes, and since it is a moral law, that we so harmonize our claims with those of others, that they can co-exist with each other, this same law imposes upon us the obligation to respect their Individuality—*i. e.*, in our method of procedure to adapt ourselves to existing relations and circumstances. For in endeavoring to realize an Idea, we assert and maintain our own Individuality; but in order that this may not be done at the expense, or by the suppression, of the Individuality of others, the preponderance which we are endeavoring to acquire must be made easy and compensated for, by the closest possible insinuation of our own Individuality into that of our hearers. Hence arose the first duty to fuse our Ideas with theirs; hence

arises, now, the second duty of recognizing their Individuality while asserting our own, and of employing the greatest carefulness while penetrating into anything that can possibly be regarded as belonging to it. But since, according to what we have before affirmed, the highest virtue is also the highest good sense, the employment of this moral adaptation, while we are endeavoring to exert an influence upon others, will be the surest means, and the necessary condition, of securing a successful result. It is this by which the *practical* man, in the higher and better sense of the word, is distinguished; and if his method is uniformly characterised by this quality, and for this reason is never fruitless, we should, while ascribing good sense to him, at the same time not overlook the moral ground and source of this quality. There are men who at first sight inspire confidence, because they assert a distinctive and superior Individuality with dignity, and set it forth with modesty, while at the same time they concede its full rights to the Individuality of every other man. Hardly have they commenced the management of a difficult case, when all obstacles and opposition vanish, because every hearer, on seeing them proceed, is soon convinced that their influence upon him can result only in his own benefit. These are the men who control and give direction to social life, and to such examples must we look if we would obtain a true and lively notion of the distinctive peculiarity of the orator. On the contrary, there are persons who are ever ready and desirous to exert a good influence upon others, but who, because they always bring forward their propositions at the wrong time, and are not able to adapt them to the individual peculiarities of those with whom

they have to do, invariably fail in their plans and enterprises : good men, perhaps, and yet, without doubt, men who need a higher moral cultivation. They are the genuinely unrhetorical natures, exactly adapted to place clearly and plainly before the eye, what the orator should not be.

Now the Law of Adaptation is as valid in relation to a rhetorical, as it is in relation to a moral procedure, and imparts to it, if it is formed after it, certain qualities which are of an ethical origin, and which, at the same time, may be regarded as the best means of exciting Affection.

In the first place, an oration adapted to existing relations, will be so suited to the hearer's power of comprehension, as that it will neither strain it to over-exertion, nor leave it unemployed. For the power of comprehension depends upon the learning and intellectual cultivation of the hearer, along with which it forms a part, and indeed a very essential part, of his Individuality, which is to be respected by the orator, and which he would offend against in an inexcusable manner, if he should fatigue it by too great obscurity, or too great plainness, in his discourse. And since, in order to avoid both these faults, a very accurate acquaintance with the Public whom he addresses is necessary, and one which he cannot obtain without a diligent study of it, he is obligated to engage in this study ; otherwise, he would incur the very same blame which he does, who undertakes a particular business, and neglects to acquire the knowledge necessary to its prosecution. It is indeed true, that, even among the same class of hearers, the degree of cultivation in each one is different ; yet, it is easy to strike a mean, and from this to form the image, if I

may so say, of a universal or model hearer ; and this image, if the orator keep it constantly before him, and address all he has to say to it, will keep him from the two extremes above-mentioned.

If an orator is not able to form a correct judgment respecting the Public which he is to address, or to occupy their attention in a manner adapted to their power of attention, this cannot be regarded as a natural and unavoidable defect, and so be merely matter of regret, but must be considered as a moral defect ; for his inadequateness ought not to have escaped his notice, and he should have given up a profession to which he had not become equal, especially since, in the majority of cases, he might have made up for what was wanting in natural talent, by persevering diligence. Nay, even if the orator possesses the greatest natural talents, it will be impossible for him to form a correct judgment respecting the intellectual state of cultivated hearers, and to adapt his conceptions to theirs, unless he possesses scientific and learned culture ; this, therefore, he should acquire ; ignorance in him is to be regarded as weakness of moral character, and as such, is to incur moral condemnation. Here, again, we see how, in the case of the orator, the activity of all his powers is, or should be, under the guidance of a moral principle.

In the acquisition of learned and scientific culture, he is to set no limits to himself ; let him go as far as he may and can ; let him keep even step with his age, or let him press on before it ; only let him never forget that Learning and Science, for him as an orator, are only means, and not ends, and that he may not put the exhibition of what he has made his own

in these departments, in the place of the moral Ideas which he is to set before the popular mind. This would be a vanity intrinsically contrary to morality ; it would cause him to lose sight entirely of the hearer's power of comprehension, and oftentimes to present things that would weary the attention of his audience to no purpose, or only awaken obscure images, instead of distinct conceptions ; and this is the second, and as it appears from investigation, also culpable error, which the Law of Adaptation forbids, in respect to the hearer's power of comprehension.

In this adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of comprehension, which, as we have seen, is of an ethical origin, we find the first means of exciting Affection. In order that the hearer may be induced to take part in a series of conceptions, it is absolutely necessary that the activity which is required of him be not fatiguing in its nature ; in case it were fatiguing, it would soon become irksome to him, and he would surrender himself to an inactivity that would render all further efforts of the orator fruitless. And even if the hearer should be willing to exert himself, to attentively follow a discourse which taxed his powers to the utmost by its obscurity, yet the too great stretch of the power of comprehension would exert a deadening influence upon Feeling and Imagination, and would render it impossible to excite them. But the power of attention is weakened by the too great plainness, as well as the too great obscurity, of that which is presented to it, and the gentler stirrings of Affection will ever disdain to wake at the bidding of an orator who cannot even satisfy the understanding.

Here, I fear, I shall be met with the objection, that he who has good sense enough to see the correctness of the remarks just made, will need nothing more than this good sense itself, in order to direct himself accordingly, and to impart to his oration the right relation to the hearer's powers of comprehension, so that the moral qualities and character of the orator need not come into account at all. This may have actually been the case in Athens, and in Rome, with many a demagogue; yet, such an example would prove nothing here; for he who in Athens, or Rome, should have set forth something utterly unintelligible, would have been immediately driven off from the bema by the scorn and laughter of his impatient hearers. Under these circumstances, therefore, where the necessity of following the rules above-mentioned was so clear and pressing, the moral character and qualities requisite in other circumstances, might, perhaps, have been dispensed with in the orator; but from the fact, that a bad man may be compelled, by circumstances of a highly pressing nature, to a certain method of procedure, it cannot be inferred that this method of procedure is not of an ethical nature, and that, other things being equal, the bad man can succeed in it as well as the good. For only contemplate, for a moment, the sacred orator of our own times, whose relation to his hearers is far more unhampered than that of the ancient orator, since they cannot react upon him in a manner so totally destructive of success, as in the case above-mentioned, and how difficult, nay, how impossible, it often seems, even for men of the shrewdest good sense, men whom no one can deny to be capable of forming a correct estimate of the capacity of their

audience, to keep themselves in their discourse upon the right level, and neither too high nor too low. Carried away by complacency in something which they have learned or originated, they at one time require impossibilities of the hearer's power of comprehension ; at another, from mere habit, sticking to common-places, they set forth that which is perfectly well known to their audience, in a prolix and wearisome manner. Does not the former testify of too great vanity and self-complacency, which are certainly faults of a moral nature ; and does not the latter, as does all supine yielding to mere habit, pre-suppose a lack of strength and elasticity in the character ?

Thus it is apparent that even this excellence in an oration —viz. that it is adapted to the hearer's power of comprehension, although it is only a very subordinate excellence, cannot be reached without qualities in the orator that are morally good. If I have succeeded in demonstrating the truth of this assertion, I believe I have thereby done those young men no little service, who are devoting themselves to Eloquence. Science and Learning prepare them beforehand for an office in which Science and Learning can no longer be the principal object of their endeavors, but must be subordinated to the higher aim, to the attainment of which they are subservient. That this higher aim is actually a higher, it will be very difficult for them to understand, especially since the instruction at the common and higher schools, as these have hitherto been constituted, exhibits Learning and Science to them as the highest of all things, to which nothing, Religion and Morality not excepted, should be preferred. In vain, therefore, are they

now urged to banish everything purely Scientific, both in Matter and Form, from their discourses; they despise this rule, which appears to them only as timid concession, and which, it cannot be denied, is commonly represented to them as such, by their teachers; in default of the Professor's chair, they would employ the Pulpit instead of it, and would make the bold attempt to raise the people to the heights where they themselves are soaring. If they finally come back from their error, yet the loss of heart and inspiration often causes them to sink down into superficiality and common-place. If, on the contrary, this accommodation of discourse to the hearer's power of comprehension is not a mere shrewd and skilful concession, but a perfectly moral procedure, if the opposite to it is contrary to duty, and if it is exhibited from this point of view, a young and noble mind will readily follow a rule, the observance of which it believes does not degrade, but, on the contrary, elevates and ennobles.

Yet the Law of Adaptation requires not only that the oration be adapted to the capacity of the hearer, but also that the orator have reference to his whole Individuality, to his position, his relations, to the occurrences which enter deeply into, and determine his fortune and fate. And this kind of adaptation is far more difficult to attain to, than the first. In order to this, it is necessary that the orator know, and have before his eye the innumerable elements which enter into the civil, moral, and religious condition of man; namely, the circle of his ideas and experiences, the thoughts that are common or foreign to him, the images with which his imagination is commonly employed, the more or less perfect Ideal of

happiness, of civil, moral, religious perfection, which floats before him, his virtues and vices, his wishes and desires, together with all the more intimate modifications imparted to his Individuality by standing in society, by wealth, by political events, by the condition of the Church and State to which he belongs.

This adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of comprehension, the best teachers of Rhetoric seem to have recognized as a means of exciting the Affections (in their sense indeed, according to which they were merely Passions); at least, I know no other reason why Aristotle in his Rhetoric, immediately after presenting the theory of the Passions, follows with a description of the manners of men, according to their age, rank, and wealth,* although he does not explain what use the orator is to make of this latter knowledge.

Cicero also, would have the orator be a shrewd and subtle man, who has thoroughly scrutinized the character, and way of thought of his hearers, according to their age and standing in society;† and he only errs in expecting of shrewdness and subtlety what may be best accomplished by morality. A crafty man may indeed succeed in detecting this or that weak side of a character, in order to attach to it the threads by which he would lead it; but in order to so enter into, and feel, the views, the sentiments, and the position of a man, as to be able to ad-

* Rhet. Lib. II. c. xii.—xvii.

† *Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter pervestiget, quid sui cives, iisque homines quibus aliquid dicendo persuadere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. Teneat oportet venas cuiusque generis, etatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid aget aut erit acturus, mentes sensusque degustet.*—*De Orat.* I. 51.

dress his whole Individuality in a manner to benefit and elevate, something more than craftiness is needed ; shrewd good sense is indeed needed, but such as is under the guidance of moral feeling, and that disinterested benevolence which readily surrenders itself up to sympathy with men, and to the contemplation of the objects in which they are interested.

Furthermore, the knowledge of the hearer's capacity thus obtained, should not be used to favor his errors and to flatter his passions, but it should be employed to excite the Affections in a negative way at first—*i. e.*, to avoid all that might displease, and so injure the hearer as such, or that might render things, in themselves indifferent to him, matters of offence. Without this care beforehand, the excitement of Affection is not to be thought of. In vain does the orator speak with fire and emphasis ; in vain is the hearer inclined to suffer himself to be warmed and animated by the Idea which the orator imparts to him, if the orator detains or wearies him in the way to the goal in view, by a thousand minor matters irksome in their nature. And this is no undue or sickly sensibility on the part of the hearer, for the claim itself, which I as an orator make upon him, to entirely surrender himself in one respect to me, imposes the duty upon me to spare him as much as possible in all other respects. Hence, the orator also, if he is endowed with true moral wisdom, must know how to go around all the difficulties which he cannot at the moment overcome ; this is at once Duty and Good Sense. Thus, the Apostle Paul, in order the better to reach his great aim, spared the prejudices of his cotemporaries, and *became all things to all men, if by any means he might save some.*

The orators of antiquity, Demosthenes perhaps alone excepted, because they did not apprehend the true ground of this Adaptation in the oration, sometimes practised a species of artifice and trickery as unworthy of a high-minded man, as it was useless towards the attainment of their aim. When Cicero pretended that he could not call to mind the name of Polycletus, and it was mentioned to him aloud by one of the by-standers,* he, without doubt, intended by this seeming ignorance of the history of Grecian Art, to fall in with the notion of his fellow-citizens, that to employ one's self with such objects as those of Art was unworthy of a Statesman. For my part, I can see in this, only an excess of Rhetorical Adaptation, and, consequently, something contrary to Morality. Moreover, I do not understand of what use this little piece of trickery could be to a man who knew how to set such mighty springs in motion. But it is the fate of all one-sided endeavors, to soon degenerate into the production of mere form without substance. This was very soon the case with ancient Eloquence, because the Ancients misapprehended the moral nature of Eloquence, and regarded it only as an instrument for the attainment of ambitious designs.†

* Verrina, IV. 3.—Wolf ad Leptineam, p. 300.

† An artifice similar to this of Cicero's, only still more shrewd and cunning, is attributed to Demosthenes, in order to explain the following passage in the oration for Ctesiphon: "For I, (thus he addresses *Æschines*,) and all these with me, call you a hireling, first of Philip and now of Alexander! If you doubt, ask these present; but I will rather do it for you. Does it seem to you, Athenians, that *Æschines* is a hireling or a guest of Alexander? Do you hear what they say?"—*Von Raumer's Translation*, p. 122.

Here, say the Scholiasts, Demosthenes purposely pronounced the

If such an extreme Adaptation on the part of the orator is to be condemned, the opposite fault—namely, striking violently against existing and unalterable relations—is likewise to be regarded as contrary to morality, and contrary to good sense. A shock of this kind annihilates immediately the effect of the most powerful oration, and we need only to examine the sort of displeasure which is excited by it, in order to see that the orator who has committed the fault in question, is chargeable, not with a defect in good sense, or in productive genius, but, what is far worse, in moral feeling. If

word *μισθώσεις*, with an incorrect accent, and represented the exclamation of the hearers, who repeated the word in order to correct the pronunciation, as an answer to his question, and as a declaration on their part that they regarded *Æschines* as an hireling. This explanation is given upon the authority of the Scholiasts, and, so far as I know, is accepted by many, because the reader is particularly delighted with discovering such artifices in orators; but that it is the correct one, I doubt. Certainly such a misplacing of the accent would have offended the ears of the Athenians extremely, and might have occasioned an exclamatory correction on their part; but could this same excitable public have thus coolly entered into the deception, and pretended to pronounce a judgment respecting *Æschines*, when they only corrected Demosthenes? It seems to me, that Demosthenes, by this artifice, in reality so impertinent to the occasion, would not have won over the minds of his hearers, but would have only exasperated them. But besides this, while examining the orations of Demosthenes, we should at least consider what is due to his character, the dignity of which, even though but half recognized, must protect him from the suspicion of having meddled with such miserable conceits; we should consider that in this most tragic hour of his life, his strongly exercised soul could only hurl bolt-like Ideas and not play with accents. Moreover, what is more natural than to suppose, as an explanation of this passage, that he could from the first reckon upon a strong party among the audience, and might anticipate that they would answer the question according to his wishes? This, much more befitting explanation is also found in the Scholiasts, who ascribe this answer to a friend of the orator, the comic poet Menander.

an audience should be so obtuse as not to be offended by mistakes of this kind—and this is oftener the case than one would think—this indeed renders the labor of the orator easier on the one side, but it renders it more difficult on the other ; for, as the audience does not perceive the want of Adaptation, neither will it perceive the presence of Adaptation in an oration. The orator, therefore, should congratulate himself only in an audience that is cultivated enough to be displeased with the slightest unbefitting expression ; if he does not find his audience to be of such a character, he must seek to elevate it to this height, while he shows it a respect which it will certainly learn more and more, to estimate and understand.

But with respect to what he may venture upon, and what he may not venture upon, let the orator decide, not according to the conjectures of worldly shrewdness and sense, but according to moral principles ; the hardest and strongest statements, provided only they are adapted and suitable—provided only the orator is called upon, by virtue of his office and his calling, to make them—will never do injury ; they will never weaken, but will always strengthen the effect of his oration, and the Affection which he would produce. How cultivated was the feeling for the Befitting and the Adapted, in the Athenians in the time of Demosthenes, and yet this orator never feared to charge home upon them, with the greatest force and impressiveness, their degeneracy, their failures and weaknesses ; and I am not aware that he ever injured the effect of his orations by the freedom which was so unmistakeably connected with his love for his country and the existing

constitution. Still less should the sacred orator fear to depict moral and religious corruption, according to its true reality, and to terrify the impenitent sinner by the retributions of the future life. He who omits to do this from fear of estranging his audience from himself, does not consider that the hearer altogether involuntarily judges of the orator according to moral rules, and allows him to venture upon all that he may rightfully venture upon; that the most vehement charges do not exasperate him, provided only he sees that the orator, by virtue of the relation in which he stands to himself, is justified therein; nay, that there is a propensity in the moral and religious nature of man, which is closely akin to the propensity for the Terrible and Sublime, by virtue of which he is better pleased with a merited humiliation, that may lead to better sentiments, than with that superficial emotion which is generated by flattering and specious discourse. Thus the renowned orators who spoke before Louis XIV. and his Court—an auditory who surely would never have pardoned the slightest impropriety in them—often employed and applied all the terrors of religion, and all the censorial power of their office, and always with the greatest effect.

While, on the one hand, Adaptation in the oration prevents every offence that might suppress Affection in the hearer, on the other it contributes directly to the awakening of Affection. If, namely, the orator moves in a circle of such thoughts, images, and allusions, as recall into memory the experiences of the hearer himself, and the scenes of which he was himself a witness, the oration must influence with double

power. For in this way the Idea is not merely made clear and distinct to his mind, but since the orator associates it with all that the hearer has himself thought and felt, the whole inner being of the hearer is taken possession of, and that inward fermentation, which we denominate Affection, is awakened. There may be many forms of expression suitable to the thought, and intelligible to the hearer ; but there is perhaps still another in particular, by which a region of his mind enveloped in darkness may be suddenly filled with light, and which at least strikes some of the manifold threads of which the web of his feelings consist ; this latter form the orator should know how to find, and he will be enabled to find it by means of that study of his hearers which is grounded in an interest for their well-being. If he should prefer another mode of presentation, to this form of clothing his thought, this would be an egotistic procedure that would punish itself by the inefficiency of the oration. But the occasional oration shows how strong the impression is, which can be produced by the wise use of feelings already existing in the hearers. If the preacher speaks on the occasion of the opening of a campaign, or of a festival in commemoration of a victory or a peace, he may, in this instance, presuppose the existence in the hearers of certain prevailing views and opinions, certain hopes and fears, certain feelings of joy and thankfulness, with greater certainty than in the case of ordinary discourses, when the relations that exist are not so determinate and precise ; and if he understands, with only moderate wisdom, how to converge all these different rays into the focus of his leading Idea, he will be able

to raise his Idea to a very high grade of Affection. This is the reason why the effect of sermons on Festival occasions is always greater than that of ordinary discourses on the Sabbath. In the former case, the hearer, however unfavorable his mental state may be for the purposes of the orator, nevertheless, always brings with him some sentiments of a religious character, upon which the orator can very easily fasten.

It also belongs to this Adaptation in the oration, that the orator never rise into expressions, phrases, and images that are above the language of cultivated society, even before an auditory that would be able to follow a higher style of thought, and to understand more exquisite modes of speech. I mention this for the sake of those who think they impart a peculiar dignity and force to their discourse, by the use of poetic ornament, by employing words which they bring forth from the dust of past centuries, and by constructions which are foreign to pure prose. But this is always only a cold show without power: if power, as I affirm, can mean nothing else than the efficiency of the oration in exciting Affection. In the throng of active life, amidst heart-rending misfortunes, during the silent hours of contemplation, does the hearer make known his thoughts and feelings to himself and to others, in a highly flowery style, and in strange unusual phraseology? Certainly not. The style of expression which spontaneously associates itself with the silent emotions of our heart, when they come forth into consciousness, is always as noble as it is simple; if therefore the orator would penetrate into our inner life, and renew again the traces of forgotten thoughts and feelings, if he would actually *address* us, he must employ the very same well-known and cus-

tomary language in which we are wont to commune with ourselves. Every strange expression, nay, every unusual phrase, tears us away from ourselves, instead of leading us back into ourselves ; and the stream of inward harmonies, which perhaps was on the point of flowing forth, suddenly breaks upon some such unexpected obstacle, and is dissipated. Moreover, with the disturbance of this flow is connected displeasure towards a man who decks himself out in a showy costume of sounding phrases, which, after all, are not so very difficult to collect together, instead of employing my common, every-day language along with me, to his own true advantage, as well as mine. Those very rare instances when the speaker selects an unusual expression for an unusual thought, are of course excepted here ; but to allow one's self in even the slightest departure from ordinary language, unless there is some particular reason to justify it, seems to me to be unadapted to the oration, and contrary to its aim, and is therefore, according to the theory of Eloquence here laid down, morally blame-worthy.

It will of course be understood in this connection, that I do not intend to disapprove of the use of Bible language ; on the contrary, I would recommend to all sacred orators, the frequent employment of the expressions and images of the sacred Scriptures, as a highly adapted and effectual means of exciting Affection, provided only they be not brought in merely to fill up empty space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted ; for the language of the Bible can never become antiquated, because it affords so many highly significant expressions for the manifold conditions of human life and states of the human heart, many

of which also appear as proverbial phrases in the language of common intercourse ; and however much, religious education, and the reading of the Bible, may have been neglected, the orator may yet, in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon with certainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a Biblical than in a Philosophical dress. But the great power of Bible language, in awakening Affection, consists principally in this—that, in it, the expression for the Understanding, and the expression for the Feelings, are not different, as in merely human representations, but are always one and the same. The figures, so frequent in the Bible, while they have all the precision of an abstract terminology, at the same time transfer the Idea into the web of human relationships, and clothe it with all that can exert influence upon the mind ; they are a ray which unites in one, both light and heat, and passes over from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the whole man. If now, as is often the case, a sentence from the Bible, on our first meeting with it, or upon after-occasions, has awakened a whole series of pious emotions, the orator, by citing it as he passes on, can evoke anew the Affection which has already become connected with it, and can apply it to the purposes of his oration. On account of this great advantage, I would advise the employment of the language of the Bible, even though the orator cannot presuppose that the hearer is acquainted with it, or that it has ever contributed to awaken his inward life ; for by this frequent employment of it, this closer acquaintance, and this influence upon the mind, will be brought about by degrees.

But that which prevents the orator from entering into the conceptions of his hearers, speaking to them in their own lan-

guage, and exciting Affection by the Adaptation of his discourse to their Individuality, is, in the last analysis of it, nothing but a moral defect. In the main, it is that self-complacent vanity which only desires the pleasure of expressing itself aptly and agreeably, and which shrinks from the difficult and oftentimes violent effort which is requisite in order to go out from self, and into another Individuality. From this weakness arise, in sacred Eloquence, the loosely constructed, flowery orations, which, indeed, since they are adapted to excite the fancy of the hearer, often meet with enthusiastic applause, (inasmuch as men generally, blinded by their own vanity, seldom set such an estimate upon the vanity of others, and chastise it, as it deserves,) yet whose idle play of thoughts and images can never produce a noble Affection urging on to great resolves. Secondly, there is also a certain aversion to the process in question, which may be found even in noble and tender minds, and which prevents them from entering into the relations of their hearers, seizing their hearts with a strong grasp, and thus giving to their discourse that Adaptation which awakens Affection. If an orator absorbs himself entirely in the Idea, and develops it with great carefulness, but touches only superficially and generally upon the relations in which it is to be realized, in order not to strike against any obstacle, or to give offence to any one, we may presuppose with certainty the existence of the very aversion above-mentioned. Thirdly, too great yielding on the part of the orator, in sacrificing his Idea and his Individuality, and in employing himself solely with the relations and inclinations of his hearers, in order to say something agreeable and pleas-

ing to them, deserves the very same, if not greater, moral condemnation, as the faults already mentioned, and exerts the same debilitating influence upon the discourse ; an orator who is thus moved, often lets his hearers melt away in powerless emotion, but he will never kindle in them a true Affection, since the clear ray of his Idea, by which alone this is to be accomplished, never breaks through the veil which surrounds it. Thus we have specified three errors : absorption in self, absorption in the Idea of the oration, absorption in the relations of the hearers. If a Rhetorical presentation of thought has a decided preponderance to one of these three sides, it is without Adaptation, and powerless. In order, therefore, to speak with perfect Adaptation, the orator must so bring together, unite, and reconcile these three different claims, which his own Individuality, the Idea of his oration, and the Relations of his hearers, make upon him, as that each one of them be satisfied without any disparagement to the others ; and in order to do this, nothing more is necessary, than is required in order to any truly moral action—namely, a constantly clear consciousness of our own Individuality, of the Idea according to which, and of the Relations in which, we act. But in order to the solution of this problem, extremely great strength of character in Rhetorical as well as in Moral respects, is necessary ; and how very much both are one and the same in essence, is seen in the fact, that orations, which are excellent both as Rhetorical and Moral processes, are not distinguished by any outward brilliancy and splendor ; for when the three different elements above-mentioned are fused together, their colors flow into each other, while, on the contrary, imperfect orations, for the very reason that

some one of these elements appears separated from the others, provided they are elaborated with any tolerable degree of ability, readily acquire a brilliancy which astonishes the ignorant hearer, but which truly enlivens neither him nor any one else.

In this respect Demosthenes deserves the very highest praise, since no orator has ever united with such a dignified presentation of his own Individuality, and such a transparent developement of his Idea, such an all-comprehending reference to existing Relations; and from the constant fusion of these three constituent elements, originates his forcible simplicity, which would have been totally destroyed, if, in his orations, the Lyrical and the Philosophical had ever been separated from the Real. On the other hand, Cicero is far less deserving of being set up as a model of Adaptation in the oration; not that he ever rises above his hearer's power of comprehension, or brings forward anything unbefitting and offensive, but at one time his own Individuality, at another, his Idea, at another, the existing Circumstances, are too prominent; and that one of these three elements which is predominant at any time, throws the other two into the shade. But on account of this very fault, his coloring is more brilliant than that of Demosthenes, and he can, in general, be understood with less laborious study into the relations of the age in which he appeared.

Without wishing in the least to compare Massillon with Demosthenes, or Bossuet with Cicero, they nevertheless have this similarity—that Massillon, like the Grecian orator, without giving up himself and his Idea, realizes to himself, in the most accurate manner, the life of his hearers; on the contrary,

Bossuet, and indeed, as I conjecture, on account of a less pure character, almost entirely neglects this latter reference. For this reason, Massillon inspires us, and we forget to admire him—the highest praise that can be given to the orator; on the contrary, Bossuet excites, even by his most sublime religious elevation, nothing but cold admiration, or, at most, an inflammation of the Fancy that is morally useless. If, moreover, the French themselves almost always place Bossuet before Massillon, this only proves, like many other judgments of their critics, how little they know how to recognize and estimate that which is truly excellent in their own literature.

APPENDIX.

T A S T E.

WHAT Taste properly is, is as much a matter of dispute, as is the place which it should hold in a Theory of Art, and the influence which should be conceded to it in the production and criticism of works of Art. Indeed, the attempt has been made in modern times to bring it into utter condemnation, and to strip it of all influence, as a perverted principle which we have derived from the French; yet since the Public, however much it may have been enjoined upon it not to exercise Taste in its judgments, does not, nevertheless, cease to regard its requisitions as valid; since, likewise, Taste sometimes unconsciously influences the judgments of those who despise it,

it would seem that it only needs to be seen in the right light, and to be placed in the right position, in order to be universally recognized. It can, indeed, find no place in such theories as recognize no other rules for Art but those which the Imagination imposes upon itself; for Taste will never have any connection with the Imagination, so long as the Imagination works separate from the other faculties of the soul. But in this very separation lies the fault; for how is it possible that Art, which, from its nature, is to seize upon the whole man, should excite into action the Imagination alone, and not the other powers also? And even if this should be the case, still the ethical power, although it will not indeed predominate in Art as it does in Rhetoric, will certainly not be without influence upon the impulse of the Imagination predominant in it.

In the ability, then, of working according to ethical Ideas, I would seek the source of Taste, and affirm that Taste is nothing but the selection of the Befitting and Adapted, guided by ethical Ideas. Its proper home, therefore, is within the sphere of Eloquence; or rather, its sphere should be extended over the whole practical life of the orator, since regard for the individual peculiarities of his fellow-men, and for the relations in which he finds himself to them, should accompany him at all times. But if Taste has become a moral habit in him, I do not understand how he can suddenly drop it, when he turns back from the circle of his outward activity into himself, in order to unfold the Ideas of his Imagination, and how he can here speak with himself in a language, and make use of a manner of representation which he would never allow

himself in, in his relations to his fellow-men. Taste in the above-given sense, should therefore extend itself over all Poetry ; the Ideas of the Imagination must be made to pass through this medium, and if this is done, they will gain in liveliness, and the discourse in power and perfection. For in order to make his work a living whole—in order to give it Individuality—the artist must impart to it characteristics of the most precise stamp ; and some of them will always be failures, unless, besides the other relations in which the work originated, the moral relations also, are to be recognized in it by the regard paid to them. But Eloquence, in respect to Taste, must always differ from Poetry in that, in the case of Eloquence, the selection of the Befitting and Adapted is accompanied with the *design* of exciting Affection, while Taste in the Poet, on the contrary, is a quality that works without any design in view, except the mere production of Beauty. Moreover, the term *Taste*, so offensive to many, would not be so unsuitable to denote such a separating, selecting principle, as has been spoken of ; while, at the same time, it would occur to us, that as the sensuous Taste manifests itself differently in different persons, so also the moral Taste does not pass the same judgments in Eloquence and Poetry, in different ages and relations ; for although the rule remains ever the same, it is modified by circumstances in the most manifold way.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS.

AFTER having previously become acquainted with the main parts into which the oration divides, we have now also seen what should be the nature of the subordinate representations by which the Ideas are developed. But the question now arises, as well in respect to those main parts, as to these subordinate representations : By what Law are their order and succession determined ? We set forth here the Law of constant Progress, and have, in the first place, to show that this is an ethical Principle.

Not only should the inward moral developement of man, considered as a striving after a perfection never to be absolutely reached, be a constant progress, but also when in active life he attempts the actualization of an ethical Idea, he should seek to approach continually, and without intermission, the prescribed goal. If the difficulties that stand in the way, determine him to entirely give up his plan, or if, occupying himself with secondary things, he suffers himself to be turned aside from the path upon which he has entered, so that he returns back into it late, and with spent energies, we justly charge him with being wanting in that heart, that constancy, that force of character which is an essential constituent of Virtue. He cannot, it is true, approach his goal always in a straight line, so to speak, and with even pace ; he will some-

times advance slower, because he must remove the obstructions which oppose him, out of his way, or because he must slowly prepare the way for a work which cannot succeed at once. But even while making these elaborate preparations, the eye should never lose sight of the goal, and the striving to reach it, must be plainly apparent, even in the greatest digressions. But this progress itself receives its perfection from the steady constancy prevailing in it—*i. e.*, from the easy connection and fusion of the parts of the process, so that each particular part, as it was occasioned and prepared for, by what preceded, so in its turn serves as the occasion and preparation for what follows. If this essential requisite be wanting, and the movement of the discourse is only by leaps and impulses, individual brilliant fragments may, indeed, be the result, but no continuous ethical life.

From Ethics, therefore, we derive the Law of constant Progress, (for it is contained necessarily and essentially in Ethics,) and not from the art of representation employed in Philosophy or Poetry, in which it is to be met with only under many limitations, nay, is often forced out by the opposite principle. For the activity of the Poet, like that of the Thinker, returns back into itself, because of the effort to impart roundness and finish to its creations, and is accompanied with a rest and satisfaction which is grounded in the consciousness of the possibility of perfectly representing its Idea. The ethical striving, on the contrary, in the consciousness that it can never reach the Ideal of its Perfection, nay, can never exhibit even a single Idea perfectly realized in actual existence, is never to give itself up to rest and self-satisfaction, but with abiding zeal,

though with reflection, is to hasten on immediately from each step in the process that has been taken, to a new one. And if the law of constant Progress is found in certain species of Poetry—as for example, the Drama—it must not be supposed that Rhetoric borrowed it from them; on the contrary, it imparted it to them, since the Drama is the representation of the ethical activity of men, and must therefore retain something of the ethical element in it.

As, therefore, the individual actions in a complete moral process join on upon one another, so also in the oration should the ethical Ideas and the adapted representations which serve to develope them, be methodically arranged. So unceasing and vehement is the progress of the genuine orator, that he detests every thought, every word that does not bring him nearer the goal, as a weakness, a fault, nay, as a sin, and casts it from him. If it is necessary to instruct the hearer in things of secondary importance, that might have influence upon his decision; to moderate his excited feelings; to obviate an objection; he checks for a moment the rapidity of his course, yet only in order to be able to advance with so much the greater speed; nay, it may sometimes seem as though he were deviating entirely from his path, yet, even in his deviation, the movement towards the goal is constantly apparent, and it is soon seen that he turned aside into the by-path, only in order to reach the goal the sooner. And in this movement, sometimes vehement, sometimes gentle, thought without effort joins on upon thought, so that, from the first to the last, there is an unbroken chain, in which not the least break, either for the Understanding or for the Feelings, is discoverable.

Furthermore, it is plain, that by the application of this ethical principle to the Rhetorical presentation of thought, its chief aim, the production of Affection, is reached. If men find in themselves no enthusiasm for a really great and beautiful Idea, the reason must be, either that they do not contemplate it in all its relations to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, or that they allow themselves to be too greatly dampened by the individual difficulties in the way of its realization. But if all the individual elements and relations of the Idea are made to pass before their minds, one after another, in rapid progression, so that they can take in at a glance, all that is great, sublime, and rich in blessing, flowing from it, it is impossible that they should not warm towards it ; every new representation on the part of the orator, is a new spur which urges them on to the realization of the Idea. At the same time, the mind depressed and bowed down by the presentation of difficulties and hindrances, is, as it were, freed from a burden, by the removal of its doubts, so that it no longer anxiously holds itself in reserve, but can freely and readily yield itself up to the influence which is exerted upon it. But in order that this warmth with which the mind begins to glow, may not grow cold, but may increase and constantly diffuse itself, it is necessary that this progress of the orator be also constant. If the thoughts are not closely linked together, so that the understanding perceives a defect in their connection ; if it is difficult for the mind to change from one feeling already awakened, to another, or to pass from a feeling to thoughts not specially connected with it, there arises Reflec-

tion in the hearer's mind, not upon the Idea, but upon the orator; and the effect of this Reflection is so chilling, that all the warmth which had already been produced perhaps, at once vanishes, and the orator must begin his work over again from the beginning. In the case of a constant Progress, on the contrary, the effect of what follows is strengthened and favored by what precedes, and the effect of what precedes by the effect of what follows.*

Thus have we shown, as we flatter ourselves, that through this Law of constant Progress, which is ethical in its origin, the chief aim of the Rhetorical presentation of thought, the excitement of Affection, is also reached. But in order to obtain a more thorough insight into the scope and application of the Law, we subjoin in addition the following particulars.

In the first place, so far as respects this necessary progress in the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it admits of narration, it entirely excludes description. In narration, the different constituent parts of a subject follow one upon another, and the progress of the oration is not checked by it; but in description, on the contrary, these constituent parts stand beside each other, and form a quiet picture, whereby the swift, strong movement of the oration is stopped. Hence the orator, if called upon, as is very often the case, to describe the character of a person, or a particular posture of things in actual life, should never in his narration exhibit the

* Cicero seems to mean the same thing, when he says: *Deinde inventa, non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio dispensare atque compenere.*—*De Orat.*, I. 31.

different qualities of a person, or the different characteristics of things, beside each other, but he should find a Historical thread, by means of which his representation may run off like a gradually developing History. It is exceedingly difficult to do this, since, in order to do it, the orator is often obliged to do violence to the representation as it exists in his own mind, and to take objects which he has apprehended and contemplated as a quiet whole, out of this form, and put them into another. Yet this is absolutely necessary; unless it be done, the orator falls away from the Rhetorical into the Poetical representation, and allows himself and his hearers a rest that is destructive of all Affection. The descriptions in the orations of the Ancients, are wrought entirely according to this principle; they are always narrative, never descriptive; in modern Rhetoric, the contrary is almost always the case, and hence the heavy dragging movement found in it.

The Law of Progress also determines the extent of the developement of each individual thought that appears in the Rhetorical series. For the orator must not allow one thought to so expand and become prominent at the expense of another, as to produce a pause in the movement of the oration. The recondite nature of many thoughts, which require developments, explanations, arguments, may often lead to this fault. Hence the genuine orator will rather make up his discourse out of thoughts that need only to be enounced, not explained and proved. Strictly speaking, it is a fault to express the same thought in different language—the first time obscurely, the second time by explanation and circumlocution; for the Law of Progress, strictly observed, requires that the de-

velopement of the thought progress with every new sentence; the orator, therefore, must know how to find immediately, the plainest, most forcible expression, and to be satisfied with it once for all.

With respect to the arguments often necessary in Eloquence, it might seem as though they must stop the swift current of the oration, and impart to it that slow movement—returning into itself—which is peculiar to Philosophy. Yet this will not be the case, provided these arguments are brought forward according to the general principles laid down in the First Book. Would the orator show the Possibility of a thing, he does it by proposing a Plan, by citing an Example, showing that in similar circumstances the like has already been done; would he prove the Actuality of a fact, he cites Testimony, and establishes its validity. In this way every thing is made out by the exhibition of the Real, of the plainly Apparent, and there is no need of a slow, tedious chain of abstract propositions. This is not necessary even when the Truth of a thing is to be demonstrated; in this case, the orator refers to a universally recognized Authority, the weight of which immediately decides the question; or he makes use of public opinion, which has already, on another occasion, decided according to truth, and shows his hearer, by means of a brief and readily-apprehended enthymeme, that he cannot possibly judge differently, or decide differently, in the present case, from what he did in the former, without falling into self-contradiction. In this way Demosthenes constructs his formidable enthymematic trains of Reasoning, which, so far from hindering the progress of the orator, are

rather to be compared to the lightning, in force and rapidity.

It often happens that a thought, in a position from which the logical arrangement would not displace it, exerts a retarding influence, and interrupts the continuity of the Rhetorical series, because it seems neither to have been sufficiently prepared for by what precedes, nor to sufficiently prepare for what follows. To avoid this case, and so to present every single thought as that it shall not only not retard, but accelerate the sweep of the oration, is one of the most difficult problems in Eloquence ; yet it may be solved, as it seems to us, by the aid of the principles which we have laid down. In order to this, we must recognise a gradation in the relative rank of the Rhetorical Ideas. Though Duty, Virtue, and Happiness, are all equal in importance, yet the three forms under which they present themselves are not. The first of these forms is the Religious, then follows the Ethical, and lastly the Political. Under these, again, stand Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, in the order in which they are here mentioned. Now in every separate developement of a subordinate Idea, if all that pertains to it is not fused with a higher Idea, and interwoven at all points with the developement of it, the steady flow of the oration is retarded and checked. Suppose that a sacred orator is discoursing with reference to the Ideas of Truth and Actuality—*e. g.*, that he wishes to present the events of his time from a religious point of view—beginning with the developement of Truth, he may, provided he has reached a proper place for it, cast a passing glance at Actuality ; for description based upon this latter subordinate Idea, if he should

begin with it, or should give it a developement independent of that of Truth, would be a dead stop, and not progress, and could not well be connected either with what followed or with what preceded.

An orator before the Court, or before the people, commits the same error, if, when he might make the higher Idea of Duty or of Virtue predominant, he neglects it, and allows himself in a developement entirely unconnected with it, of the Idea of Civil or Positive Law, which he should have employed only as a corollary and confirmation of the former. With all the modesty that becomes us Moderns in criticising the great models of Antiquity, I venture to charge *Æschines* with committing this latter error in his oration against Ctesiphon. Since his attack upon Demosthenes in strictness was based upon the Idea of Virtue, since he wished to represent his life and character as unworthy and detestable, it was a mistake to dwell so long, as he does, in the very beginning, upon the positive statutes that might take from his opponent the crown which had been decreed to him. We feel, in the perusal, how weak this whole first part of his oration is, and how little it prepares for the succeeding part, in which he examines the life of Demosthenes ; nay, between these two parts there is a chasm over which he could not possibly carry his hearers without their minds becoming entirely cold and emotionless. That Demosthenes perceived this mistake, it seems to me is evident, from the circumstance that he protests in the very beginning of his oration, against the demand of his opponent, that he shall in the defence follow the same plan which he did in the attack ; far from doing this, he rather sets

forth the Idea of Virtue as the Idea upon which he shall found his oration, and not until after he has refuted a great portion of the objections brought against him, by a history of his past life, does he occupy himself with the examination of the positive laws which seem to be adverse to the proposition of Ctesiphon. Hence, from the beginning of this oration to the end, there is no pause to be perceived, but the mind is kept continually on the stretch, and borne along unceasingly from one important point to another.

To impart this constant flow to an oration, is perhaps the most difficult among the many difficult things in Eloquence. A Poem, like the Poet himself, is born ; in some fine moment of inspiration it stands out before him, an articulated whole, and, so far as the place, at least, is concerned, is completed without further effort. But as Virtue is born with no man, but is acquired only through a long series of efforts, so likewise the oration, considered as a moral product, is never complete in its first origin, but becomes so only by means of labor and pains perseveringly applied to it. Nay, inasmuch as the activity even of the most virtuous man can never be wholly perfect—*i. e.*, can never be wholly conformed to the Law, and, at the same time, to existing relations—the question may arise, whether the oration, which, according to my assertion at least, is a moral act and process, can be perfect—a question which I should answer in the negative. The Adaptation which has been spoken of in a former chapter, can itself be reached only approximately ; for in order to be perfect, an absolutely Divine knowledge of all characters and relations would be requisite. The second law also, laid down by us—that of constant Pro-

gress—in its perfection can belong only to the action of God in the government of the world, but never to human action, which is ever imperfect. But be this as it may, so much is certain, and with respect to it every man will agree with me, and the more readily the better orator he is, that in the plan of the oration as it is first presented to the mind, the thoughts are never found already arranged in this constant progressive flow, but must be afterwards wrought into it. As they first present themselves, they are hard, brittle, and separate particles; the mind must seize them, and by grinding them incessantly upon each other, crush them, until the friction kindles the mass, and it runs like molten ore. The higher Ideas, thrown, as it were, into this solution, take up the thoughts which belong to them, and which, now that they are fluid, obey the mystic power which attracts like to like, so that they form themselves into a firm chain.

Here the truth of our assertion becomes very apparent again, that it is the Character which makes the orator. Could the most brilliant Imagination, and the most profound and penetrating Reason, succeed in so elaborating the thoughts, if they were not guided and supported by the power of the moral Will? Both Imagination and Reason, taken by themselves alone, lead the orator away from the sharply-drawn line along which he should move, and seduce him into a useless pause, and an idle undue unfolding of his thoughts. They can find no interest at all, in the elaboration of the unpretending, highly simple conceptions borrowed from common life; at the same time, they grow weary, and, finally, try to exchange an irksome business for one more agreeable, unless they are actuated and

urged on by another power. And this power is not the mere empty rage for shining before an assembly ; for vanity is not capable of such a tension of mind ; nay, vanity does not even feel itself to be called upon to make such an effort, since it is satisfied with a loosely constructed oration garnished with some showy passages. For the hearer is capable of criticising such an oration and of admiring it, but let him be ever so cultivated, he can never do full justice to an excellence lying so deep as the steady unceasing sweep of thought. He only feels its effects upon him, like the breathing of the living Spirit, without knowing the cause ; and for the very reason that so much that is Beautiful and Excellent arises in his own mind, he forgets that the orator has spoken excellently. That Demosthenean determination, that iron diligence, which is requisite in order to the formation of the rhetorical, constantly progressive train of thought, can spring only out of the effort to fill the minds of others with great Ideas, in which the orator has lost himself ; the effort to satisfy his own conscience, and to employ only that which can rightfully contribute towards his success : and what is such an effort but the moral power of the Character in its finest developement and highest dignity ?

CHAPTER VII.

THE LAW OF VIVACITY.

IN the beginning of this treatise, we attempted to seize the active process of the orator in its origin, as it unfolds itself under the guidance of certain definite moral Ideas. In this second part of the work, we have sought to become acquainted with the nature of the representations with which the leading Idea of the orator becomes encompassed, as well as with the rules in accordance with which these representations are linked together. We have now to conceive of the active process of the orator, as it comes forth into Language from his inward being, and here we find that his progress in the developement of his Idea, and the effect produced by it upon the hearers, cause his own relation to them, though remaining the same in substance, to change every moment in respect to individual circumstances ; and we demand that this active process of his, without wavering in its essential character and purpose, do, nevertheless, through a constant variation in the form, keep company with all these different variations in his relations. This is the third and last Law of the Rhetorical presentation of thought. We denominate it the Law of Vivacity. Like the former Laws that have been mentioned, this Law also is of ethical origin, and wholly foreign to the Philosophical, as well as the Poetical, presentation of thought. In both of these latter the mind isolates itself, and since it is not its de-

sign to exert an influence upon the circumstances which surround it, so neither does it allow circumstances to exert an influence upon itself. Hence, the unvarying uniformity of the state and condition in which it remains from the beginning to the end of its work, allows the mind, in these latter cases, to give to its products a fixed, unchangeable form. Moral activity, on the contrary, would entirely preclude such an isolation; it is itself a constant reception of outward influences, and an equally constant reaction upon them; and since all that is outward is never still, but fluctuates restlessly hither and thither, man, when in action, must change his position in respect to the outward every moment. This is not bending the Will to the force of circumstances, but is in reality the only means of obtaining dominion over them; their constantly varying pressure would utterly overwhelm, if the manner of meeting them did not vary with equal rapidity. True Virtue on the side of Law, is indeed unalterably the same, but on the side of Life, is constantly changing and new. It would betray a want of elasticity in the character, if one should continue the same way of action in entirely different circumstances.

This change in the position and movements of the orator, peculiar to moral activity of all sorts, can be perceived in the case of the activity of the orator, only in the thoughts and the words, and in their constantly varying turns, since the orator makes use of thoughts and words only, in order to the realization of his Idea. These turns are the so-called rhetorical Figures: an expression which must not be taken to denote mere ornaments coldly and artificially contrived to set off the

discourse, (to which the expression might indeed lead,) but *Turns* and lively *Movements* in thought and language, prompted by the Imagination under the guidance of rhetorical Affection in conflict with the opposing sentiments of the hearers; for which reason, perhaps, these latter expressions are preferable, because they are liable to no such misunderstanding. Similar turns arise easily and naturally in the social intercourse of cultivated and lively minds. For since social life of the higher order involves the mental cultivation of minds through the interchange of views, each man alternately playing the part of the orator and the hearer, it is evident that, although from the language of such social life, nothing indeed is to be learned in relation to the rhetorical series of representations, because it is, of necessity, fragmentary in its matter, yet much is to be learned from it in relation to the turns of thoughts and words, which become more lively and forcible on account of the closer action and reaction within this sphere. The so-called Figures which are employed by orators, and which are specifically enumerated by Rhetoricians, are in reality only such turns of thought and expression as arise in the active intercourse of men, elevated and polished in order to adopt them to a higher connection. Hence, if the orator would employ Figures rightly, he should not borrow them from manuals of Rhetoric, or even from the most perfect works in Eloquence, but should go back to the language of common intercourse, and appropriate to his own purposes all those living movements and turns in thought and expression, the influence of which he has felt upon himself, and has also imparted to others. Or rather, the orator must

realize the hearer to himself with definite features, with all his opposing views and inclinations, and represent the whole oratorical process to himself, not monologically, but dialogically; then he will know instinctively, the proper time* to waken attention, to instruct, to exhort, to show the connection or the opposition of several thoughts, to meet an objection, to hurl it back again, to place a truth in clear light by an unexpected surprising turn, to pass from one truth to another, to restrain his feelings, to give them full play, &c. Having such a lively sense of his position and relations, and of the changes which he is producing in them by the progress which he is constantly making, his thoughts, and consequently, their expression, will take on a different form at every step.

But if this alternation of forms in the rhetorical presentation of thought, is of ethical origin, as we have endeavored to show, it is also the most powerful and effectual means of all, in exciting Affection.† For Affection in the hearer is kindled by Affection in the orator; and how can the orator show more plainly, that he is wholly animated by an Idea, and by the striving to impart it to others, than by exhausting all the most lively forms of presentation? Adaptation, in the discourse, taken by itself alone, would not produce such an impression; even the firmest and most labored chain of thought, unless each link in it were distinguished by a peculiar structure, would, in the end, only weary by a fixed uniformity. But by means of the peculiar, and often surprising

* Cicero. *Orator.* 39 et 40.

† *Jam vero ad affectus nil magis ducit.—Quint.* IX. 1.

turn, in which each new representation is announced, it is made to pierce more deeply into the mind, which, incessantly stimulated on so many sides, is compelled, in the end, to yield itself up without resistance, to the exercise of Affection.

This influence upon the Affections is the distinguishing mark by which we can recognise Rhetorical figures, and can separate them from Poetical. The latter are created by the Imagination for the Imagination; they are a painting, a picturing, a representing. The Rhetorical figures are produced by the Mind—using this term to denote the whole inner being of man so far as it is under the guidance of the Will—for the Mind; they should seize, enchain, move, carry away. Poetical figures are brilliant and adorned, and Poetic Art delights in their splendor; Rhetorical figures are a naked power, which avoids all pomp, because its influence is liable to be hindered thereby, or to be directed to the Imagination instead of the Affections. If the orator would acquire a quick feeling and an unerring sense for Rhetorical figures, let him read Demosthenes; for in respect to him, the Ancients boast that he never brought forward a thought without expressing it in some peculiar figure.* In reading Demosthenes, we shall also perceive most clearly, how great is the difference between Rhetorical and Poetical figures; for no style can be freer from all that we denominate Poetry of expression, than that of Demosthenes. In saying this, however, we would by no means assert, that none of those figures which are commonly termed Poetical, are to be permitted in an ora-

* *Cicero Orator.* c. 39.—Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatio[n]e sententia dicitur.

tion. Everything depends upon the application, upon relative position and influence, and it is very possible indeed, that in a different use and connection the same figure would at one time depict to the Imagination, at another awaken Affection.

There being this difference between Poetical and Rhetorical figures, the specific enumeration of the former is as proper, as that of the latter is improper. Since the Imagination renders itself independent of the external world, and allows it no influence upon its creations, its forms are by no means innumerable in their manifoldness; for their source is in the Imagination alone, which, notwithstanding all its opulence, is, like every human faculty, limited by certain definable laws. Hence, in the enumeration of the different species of Poetry, as well as in the specification of Poetical figures, completeness is attainable. But since the moral activity of man, on the contrary, is constantly conditioned by his relations to the external world, all the changes of which can never be computed, it is impossible to enumerate with satisfactory completeness, the forms under which this activity appears. For this reason, we may not in Eloquence, as in Poetry, assume certain species distinguished by Form and Matter; and hence it was an absurd undertaking to attempt to bring under certain fixed rubrics, the turns which the thoughts of the orator receive, under the influence of the constantly varying circumstances amidst which his activity is put forth. This mistake would never have been made, if the ethical character of Eloquence had been recognized, and if Eloquence had been properly distinguished from Poetry. That the undertaking was a failure is perfectly evident. There are fine and noble turns of thought in De-

mosthenes, which no Rhetorician has yet put on his list; and many have also been invented by orators of the Church, that were entirely unknown to the Ancients.

Owing to this confounding of Poetical and Rhetorical figures, there arose among the Ancients an entirely false view of the use and influence of the latter. Cicero and Quintilian agree in this, that they may, in part at least, be employed as adornment merely, of the oration, and to please the hearer.* But this should never be the purpose for which they are employed, if, as we affirm, they are not productions of the Imagination for the Imagination, but of the Mind for the Mind. Quintilian gives another excellent rule, but one that by no means harmonizes with his other statement just cited, when he says, that all that does not promote the design of the orator, hinders it;† and certainly, nothing so little promotes, and consequently so greatly hinders, the awakening of a strong Affection that seizes upon the whole mind, and breaks forth into acts, as that light play of the Imagination which leaps from figure to figure. Hence, we assert that no figure should be allowed in an oration, unless each and every word in it, according to the expression of Quintilian,‡ awaken an Affection of some sort. Any other use of figures on the part of the orator would betray a departure from his purpose,—*i. e.*, a moral weakness,—and instead of contributing to his design, would

* Ex collocatione verborum quæ sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum afferunt ornatum orationi.—*Cicero. Orator.* c. 39.—Major pars harum figurarum posita est in delectatione.—*Quintilian, IX. 3.*

† Obstat enim quidquid non adjuvat.—*Quintilian, VIII. 6.*

‡ Quot verba, totidem affectus.—*Quintilian, IX. 3.*

only stand in its way,—*i. e.*, would leave the mind cold, instead of warming it.

Furthermore, figures, which consist in peculiar turns of thought, are likewise subject to those Laws of Adaptation and constant Progress, which we have laid down for the guidance of Rhetorical discourse generally. If the orator wastes the most impressive and powerful of these figures upon trivial occasions, or employs them imprudently at a time when the mind is not prepared for so violent an impression, this unsuitable application of them will hinder and destroy their influence. And since, in order to prevent Affection from becoming cold, the thoughts themselves must run on in a continual series, it is also necessary, in order to the same end, that the turn which one thought has taken, easily and naturally lose itself in that which the following thought will assume. In this connection, it is also to be remarked, that the most perfect concatenation of figures loses its effect, if it is repeated successively, after short intervals; for the mind once impressed, is immediately rid of the impression, by the repetition of that which produced it, and is led away to an idle contemplation of the mere Form, irrespective of the Matter; the constant recurrence of which would, in this case, produce only a poetico-musical enjoyment.

And as we have seen that every offence against the Rhetorical Laws is to be regarded as a moral defect, so also the wrong use of figures is not to be ascribed to a want of Genius, but only to a weakness of Character. It is vanity, if the orator is profuse in figures for the sake of show and ornament; it is obtuseness of moral feeling, if the orator em-

ploys them unsuitably ; it is sluggishness, incapacity of enthusiasm in respect to lofty Ideas, if the orator does not understand how to give to a thought those forcible turns by which alone he can produce the designed impression. Hence, not by means of the mere knowledge of this or of other rules, but only by means of those moral excellences which are opposed to the faults above-mentioned, will the orator be enabled to employ figures rightly and with effect. In order to this, a mind is needed which can warm towards moral Ideas ; which, along with all its inspiration and enthusiasm, can keep up a calm, accurate survey of circumstances, and which is far more interested in the true advantage of the hearer—in his improvement and elevation—than in his applause.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROSE.

In the beginning of this Second Book, we promised to sketch the main features of a Theory of Prose, and to derive them from the ethical principle which we have sought to establish as the foundation of Rhetoric. We now attempt to fulfil this promise.

We shall first set forth the distinguishing marks of Prose, while at the same time, for the sake of greater distinctness, we shall compare them with the peculiar characteristics of Poetic discourse.

The first difference between Poetry and Prose lies in the Period. Not that the Period is peculiar to Prose alone, and might be dispensed with in finished Poetry. But in Poetry it appears only as a necessary form in the connection of thoughts upon which no special emphasis is laid. In Prose, on the contrary, while it retains this first original characteristic, it acquires a still higher significance, and seems to serve particular purposes. Hence we require in Prose, that each Period be marked by something peculiar to itself, and be distinguished from what precedes and follows it, by its form, while in Poetry, we do not regard it as a fault, and hardly notice it, if several sentences exceedingly simple, and entirely similar in their structure, follow one another.

The second difference lies in the words used. In Poetry,

every word has worth, not only by virtue of its sense, but also by virtue of its sound and its mere existence ; the most important and the most unimportant words, in respect to sense, as integral parts of the same whole, have equal rank, like citizens of a free State. In Prose, on the contrary, the worth of words differs according to their sense ; in every sentence there is one or more words which, by their peculiar position, are elevated and placed in the light, so that the others are subordinate to them, and seem to be designed only to elevate and minister to them.

The third difference lies in the relation between long and short syllables, which, in Poetry, is termed Metre, in Prose is termed Number. The difference between the two may perhaps, be best exhibited under the following general characteristics : Metre, though adapted to the Idea, yet appears as something independent in itself, and seeks to attract attention to itself, aside from the thoughts and feelings expressed through it. Hence it not merely determines, with the greatest exactness, the number and succession of long and short syllables ; it also separates them into individual metrical members, the frequent repetition of which, impresses their peculiar form so much the more, upon the ear and the mind. If the difference between long and short syllables is not duly marked in a sentence, Poetry makes up for what its form would lose thereby in peculiarity and independence of character, by counting and limiting the number of the syllables which compose the individual line, and by the regular recurrence of the same sound at the end of the verse. Number, on the contrary, far from separating itself from the

thought, remains constantly subordinate to it, and it would be regarded as one of the greatest faults of a Prose Period, if one of its parts, by a succession of tones too striking and too agreeable to the ear, should attract attention from the Matter to the Form. Number, therefore, arranges the succession and number of long and short syllables, only so far as is necessary in order that the impression of the discourse upon the sensuous organs may be adapted to the impression which is to be produced upon the mind, so that the mind may not feel less, because the ear has either experienced no agreeable sensation at all, or has been offended. And that Number may not usurp an independence that does not belong to it, it is necessary, and is also universally required, that it be adjusted most accurately to the Matter, as well as the Form; that it vary with every new thought, nay, every new Period, and thus flow forth in constant manifoldness.

If, as I believe, the peculiar characteristics of Prose have been sufficiently exhibited in what has been said, the question now arises: From what principles can we deduce such a form of discourse, and show that it must be constituted so, and not otherwise? This problem seems never to have been proposed even, while yet a similar one respecting the forms of Poetry, has employed many Theorizers, and has been successfully solved by them. Why, then, is there Prose at all? What right has it to exist by the side of Poetry? Should men generally, speak only in verse, and is it owing merely to convenience or inability, that they do not? We feel that this cannot possibly be, for there are modes of presenting thought in which Poetical forms cannot be employed at all.

And this does not arise from their intrinsic difficulty, for finished Prose has its peculiar excellences, and, consequently, its difficulties also, which are not easier to master than those of Versification. If, now, Prose is to maintain itself as a peculiar form of presenting thought, the rightfulness of its claims must be demonstrable from rational grounds. Or shall we, after having deduced the necessity of the forms of Poetry, represent Prose as a thorough and complete opposite to them, and consider the matter as settled in this way, because there can be nothing which has not its opposite? But, not to mention that this principle is not justifiable in itself, it could not, even if it were correct, find its application here, because although Prose and Verse indeed differ from each other, they by no means constitute a proper antithesis, the members of which run parallel to each other, and have purely opposite and mutually correspondent marks.

The right of Prose to assert its place beside Poetry, and the necessity of the characteristic marks perceived in it, can be satisfactorily shown, only in case it is construed from ethical principles. In deriving the rules to which the moral activity of man, so far as it makes use of discourse for its purposes, is subjected, we had arrived at the Law of Vivacity; while we further develope it, we shall see Prose with all that is peculiar and distinctive in it, originating from it.

For, in the first place, since according to the Law of Vivacity, each thought should appear with a peculiar turn and movement, it must naturally impart a peculiar form and structure to the Period also, in which it is presented. On

this ethical ground, therefore, the carefulness with which the Period is formed in Prose, is explained and justified, while, on the contrary, a similar carefulness in Poetry, would not only be unnecessary, but a fault also. For the change in the form of the Period is expressive of a change in the mental state—a change which is required in the orator, but not allowable in the Poet, since he purposes to exhibit only one and the same tone of mind. With the same right that figures in the Thought are assumed in Rhetoric, we believe we may assume figures in the Period, which are to be distinguished still further, from figures in the Language. Moreover, much that is cited by Rhetoricians under this latter name, is a peculiarity in the structure of the Period, rather than in the position of the words—*e. g.*, the Climax, the Antithesis, the Isocolon, the Prosapodosis, and the Coinotes, arising from the connection of the Epibole and Epiphora.

But not only does the Law of Vivacity exert its influence upon the structure of the Period, it also exerts it secondly, upon the position of the words. For since the greatest care must be taken that the thoughts do not flow into each other, so as to form one uniform mass, it is evident that those particular words which express each particular thought most plainly, should be made prominent, and be distinguished from the others. From this ethical view of Prose, not only is the peculiar Emphasis laid upon the most important words—as the Substantive, Adjective, Verb—explained, but also the origin of the more exquisite figures of Speech—as Paronomasia, Paradiastole, Antanaclasis, Epanode, Diaphora, Homœoptoton, &c.

The use of these figures in Poetry, is condemned of right, because in Poetry the essential thing is not the distinguishing of one thing above another, but the connecting of one thing with another. And if Poetry has appropriated one or another of these figures—as, *e. g.*, the Homœoptoton, from which Rhyme seems to have arisen—it has yet entirely altered it; for in Prose, a proposition is individualized by the Homœoptoton; in Poetry, the metrical lines are linked and united together by Rhyme.

Finally, in the third place, the Law of Vivacity permits neither Metre, nor Rhyme, nor the numeration of syllables; for through these, the outward form of presentation acquires a repose, and an evenness of proportion—it expresses a complacency—which, indeed, belongs necessarily to the finished unfolding of Poetical Ideas, but which must ever be foreign to the active process of the orator, which is full of Affection in itself, and seeks to awaken Affection in the hearer. Nevertheless, since that which is peculiar in the Rhetorical thought seeks to express itself, not only in the structure of the Period, and the position of the words, but also in the relation of the long and short syllables; since, in order to the more distinct separation of the thoughts, there must be the slower pace of some, and the more rapid flight of others, and this difference must be made perceptible to the mind through the ear, the Law of Vivacity requires a mingling of syllables, in respect to their quantity, suited to the existing thought, but going no further than to vary with each Period, and never occupying the mind at the expense of the thought. For if this were the case, the orator would betray a complacency which is pro-

per in the Post, but which is forbidden to him by the Law of Vivacity; and, moreover, he would fail to reach the end at which he aims—the production of Affection in the hearer—if the hearer should come to be as much delighted by the musical enjoyment of the melody, as impressed by the force of the thought.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSION.

We have thus far endeavored to unfold and perfect our theory of the ethical nature of Eloquence, in three different ways ; by showing, first, that all of its essential Laws are of moral origin ; secondly, that a morally good Character, alone, imparts the inclination and the ability to follow these Laws ; thirdly, that the orator is sure of success, only in proportion as he strictly obeys these moral Laws, and puts away all references of a less pure nature.


And as in running out these laws, we have arrived at the construction of Prose as a necessary form of presenting thought, we believe we may here lay down our pen, inasmuch as what has been said will be sufficient to enable him who has followed us thus far, to form a judgment respecting the correctness of our hypothesis ; and it will not be difficult for him who falls in with it, to apply the principles we have laid down, to the subject of Declamation, and other secondary subjects connected with Eloquence, of which we have not treated.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Page 9, line 3d from top, insert "it" after "is."

- " 72, " 16th " " a comma after "Worthiest."
- " 87, " 13th " " a comma after "independently."
- " 92, " 20th " " read "With" instead of "Without."
- " 139, " 14th " " "plan" instead of "place."
- " 143, " 22d " " "agent" instead of "orator."
- " 144, " 9th " " "mutual" instead of "mental."
- " 144, " 22d " " "adapt" instead of "adopt."



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